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SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
This article considers some of the difficulties arising from how English law conceptualises 
certain types of security interests over Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), and the problems 
arising from dual registration systems.  This analysis is informed by a critical comparison of the 
current English doctrine, alongside the US system and the proposals from UNCITRAL.  It is 
shown that no single system is ideal for regulating a world of integrated goods (whereby goods 
and software are inextricably interconnected), but aspects of different systems can be useful for 
dealing with the complex but necessary relationship between tangibles and IPRs.  It will be 
further argued that reform of security interest law resulting in a single register for security 
interests which treats goods and IPRs as analogous for security purposes, is necessary.  
Recommendations to deal with problems concerning purchase money security interests, and 
third party purchasers in potential conflicts with IPRs holders, are also put forward. 
 
Keywords: Security Interests; Intellectual Property; Embedded Software; Integrated Goods; Law 
Reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
The laws of information technology and commercial finance speak, but not to one another.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 JC Lipson, ‘Financing Information Technologies: Fairness and Function’ [2001] Wis L Rev 1067 at 1068. 
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The English law on security interests over intellectual property rights (IPRs) is conceptually and 
practically confusing, complex, and incoherent.
2
  This is recognised by some,
3
 but ignored by 
others.
4
  The most comprehensive analysis is probably still Townend’s Using Intellectual 
Property as Security,
5
 which suffers from being twenty years old.  In a more recent (though 
brief) analysis, Tosato provides an outline bibliography which indicates at best a moderate 
growth in the body of literature on security interests over IPRs in English law,
6
 and it remains 
true that ‘[v]ery little has been written on the problem […]’.7  This article addresses this lacuna. 
There are potential explanations for this limited body of academic commentary.  The 
English focus on characterising the security interest as opposed to the nature of the property 
covered,
8
 the arguable sufficiency of assignment (and other equitable concepts) for obtaining 
security over intangible assets,
9
 the historic lack of reliance on IPRs as assets for secured 
financing,
10
 along with the inevitable difficulties facing lenders as a result of the ‘[t]he inherent 
                                                 
2
 For the purposes of this article, a security interest is taken to simply mean an interest over an asset that secures an 
obligation.  This article does not aim to provide an exhaustive outline of the English law of security interests: the 
reader is directed to the standard texts on such matters.  The discussion of the conceptual problems with protecting 
security over IPRs, below at text following n 59, examines the types of security interest relevant to this specific 
topic.  For a useful recent analysis of security interests, see GG Castellano ‘Reforming Non-Possessory Secured 
Transactions Laws: A New Strategy?’ (2015) 78 MLR 611 (arguing in favour of the UNCITRAL system generally).   
3
 Allen and Overy LLP made this point in their submission to I Hargreaves Digital Opportunity: A Review of 
Intellectual Property and Growth (May 2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/mql4pjy, but the Hargreaves Review 
did not discuss the issue.  
4
 cf I Davies, ‘Technology-based small firms and the commodification of intellectual property rights’ in J de Lacy 
(ed) The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2010) 308 at 309 noting that this issue was not considered in A Gowers Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property (December 2006). 
5
 DMR Townend Using Intellectual Property as Security (London: The Intellectual Property Institute, 1996). 
6
 See eg A Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’ (2011) 6 J of Intel Prop L and Practice 93 at 94 fn 7. 
7
 M Henry ‘Mortgages of intellectual property in the United Kingdom’ (1992) 14 EIPR 158 at 158.   
8
 M Bridge, L Gullifer, G McMeel and S Worthington The Law of Personal Property (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2013) at para 26-001. 
9
 H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (Oxford: OUP, 
2nd ed, 2012) at paras 1.13, 7.73. 
10
 cf Davies, ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4, at 308-309; Tosato, ‘Security interests over intellectual 
property’, above n 6, at 93 fn 4.  See also Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions 
(DP 151, June 2011) 246; A Orr and T Guthrie ‘Fixed security rights over intellectual property in Scotland’ (1996) 
18 EIPR 597. 
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vagueness and fluidity’ of such assets,11 may explain (though not necessarily justify) the often 
cursory analyses of this issue.
12
  Nevertheless, this article argues against such conservatism, 
because of the costs it creates.  Where there are ‘interlocking structures of copyright and 
commercial finance law’,13 there is ‘tension’ between IP regimes protecting endeavour by 
exclusive rights and secured credit regimes of priority and enforcement rules:
14
 ‘the result is 
extreme uncertainty.’15  The increasing value of IPRs as viable assets for security provides a 
strong financial incentive to examine this area of law.
16
 
This article critiques the current English system of security interests over IPRs.  The next 
section will briefly examine how the increasing integration of goods and IPRs can lead to 
problems in the field of secured financing.  Having thus indicated some of the technological 
drivers for reform, this article outlines the practical and conceptual difficulties facing creditors 
and debtors.  Then the dangers of multiple, mixed regimes for security (whether functional, 
formal, or merely apparent) over different types of IPRs, which in turn are distinct from regimes 
governing security over goods, are examined.  The potential of integrated goods means an 
effective secured transactions law should treat IPRs as functionally analogous to goods, 
especially in how they operate as debt-bearing assets.  This path necessarily involves a unitary 
register of security interests, subjecting IPRs to rules on PMSIs, and providing clear and 
                                                 
11
 J Lipton ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’ in de Lacy (ed) Reform of UK Personal Property Security 
Law (above n 4) 285 at 288.   
12
 cf Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at paras 
14.61–14.76; W Cornish, D Llewellyn and T Aplin Cornish, Llewellyn & Aplin: Intellectual Property: Patents, 
Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2013) (no discussion of the issue); L 
Bently and B Sherman Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: OUP, 4th ed, 2014) pp 300-301 (copyright), 645 
(patents), 1097-1110 (trade marks). 
13
 PR Barry ‘Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral: Evaluating the Reform Proposals’ (1994-95) 46 Hastings LJ 
581 at 584. 
14
 Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 308. 
15
 S Ghosh ‘The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property Optimist Examines 
Article 9 and Bankruptcy’ (1997-98) 8 Fordham Intel Prop, Media & Ent LJ 99 at 101. 
16
 See eg Davies, ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 308; V Bromfield and J Runeckles ‘Taking security 
over intellectual property: a practical overview’ (2006) 28 EIPR 344 at 344. 
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definitive protection for third party purchasers from the grasp of holders of encumbrances over 
IPRs.  In making this argument, this article will make recommendations drawing from current 
domestic and international doctrines and systems. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IPRS AND GOODS: TECHNOLOGICAL 
DRIVERS FOR REFORM 
IPRs and goods have always been in a complicated relationship: the integration of IPRs and 
goods may make a tangible thing useable,
17
 or it may make a tangible thing valuable or 
meaningful,
18
 and so determining the boundaries of IP law often relies on dealings in goods.
19
  
Thus the story of Watt’s steam engine was one of patent disputes, and the difficult relationship 
between IP and tangibles continues unresolved now that ‘[d]igitization is the new steam’.20  The 
integration between IPRs and tangible things requires deep analysis of various aspects.  The 
specific focus of this article is the need for reconciliation between the relatively well-developed 
(even if otherwise complex and archaic) law on security interests over goods, and the relatively 
unknown and inappropriate regime for security interests over IPRs.  It is tentatively suggested 
the necessity of reform will become particularly acute with the development of integrated goods 
and by the growth of an “internet of things”.   
                                                 
17
 This “non-usability” may be a consequence of law: Microbeads SA v Vinhurst Road Markings [1975] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 375. 
18
 Niblett v Confectioners’ Materials Co Ltd [1921] 3 KB 387; Accurist Watches Ltd v King [1992] FSR 80 (ChD) at 
87-88 (Millett J). 
19
 I Eagles and L Longdin Refusals to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and Economics 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 119.  See also eg DL Burk, ‘Copyright and the New Materialism’ in J Lai and A 
Maget (eds) Intellectual Property and Access to Im/material Goods (2015, forthcoming) (UC Irvine School of Law 
Research Paper No 2015-69) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2611166.  
20
 DR Desai ‘The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and Disruption’ (2014) 65 Hastings LJ 1469 at 
1481. 
 Page 5 of 52 
 
The internet of things has been described as consisting of ‘a complex network of connected 
smart objects and devices [which] basically consists of three elements: (1) smart devices, (2) 
protocols for facilitating communication between the smart devices, and (3) systems and 
methods for storing and analyzing data acquired by the smart devices.’21  The internet of things 
moves on from a system of connection between people via things to a system whereby things 
themselves are interconnected.
22
  The logical consequence, in the words of the CEO of Google, 
Eric Schmidt, is that  
 
the Internet will disappear … There will be … things that you are interacting with that you 
won’t even sense … It will be part of your presence all the time.  Imagine you walk into a 
room, and the room is dynamic.  And with your permission and all of that, you are 
interacting with the things going on in the room.
23
   
 
An internet of things necessitates integrated goods, ie goods which have extensive and 
potentially novel forms of integration between the physical functionality of the goods and the 
software enabling the functionality.
24
  Examples of integrated goods include smartphones, which 
                                                 
21
 W K Robinson, ‘Patent Law Challenges for the Internet of Things’ (2015) 15 Wake Forest Journal of Business 
and Intellectual Property Law 655, 657. 
22
 Ibid at 661-62. 
23
 M Prigg ‘Google’s Eric Schmidt claims the ‘internet will disappear’ as everything in our life gets connected’ 
Dailymail.com (22 January 2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/lzhvxql.  See further eg M Chui, M Löffler and R 
Roberts ‘The Internet of Things’ (March 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/n4ksysw; B Wasik ‘In the 
Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act As One’ (14 May 2013), available at http://tinyurl.com/kbrylt5; W 
K Hon, C Millard and J Singh, ‘Twenty Legal Considerations for Clouds of Things’ (4 January 2016) Queen Mary 
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 216/2016, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716966.  The 
internet of things is part of the EU’s digital agenda: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/internet-things; 
http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/.  It also has potential for the development of circular economies: see e.g. 
Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the Circular Economy Potential (8 February 2016), 
available at http://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications.  
24
 See eg S Thomas ‘Goods with embedded software: obligations under Section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979’ 
(2012) 26 Int Rev of L, Computers & Tech 165; S Thomas ‘Sale of Goods and Intellectual Property: Problems with 
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need software, protected by copyright, to operate at primary (operating systems), secondary 
(inbuilt user software) and tertiary (third party apps) levels.  Other examples might include 3D 
printers, which not only require software to operate but will also require what are in essence 
blueprints, protected by copyright or other forms of IP such as design rights, to produce the 3D 
printed objects.
25
  A third type may be smart meters which obtain and generate data (whether for 
example they measure traffic flow, home utilities usage, or other commercial behaviour).  We 
can thus see the operative (smartphones), productive (3D printers), and information-generative 
(smart meters) functions of software coming to the fore, but it must be acknowledged that these 
functions (particularly the generative function) are embedded throughout different integrated 
goods to varying degrees.  
It is worth noting that the terminology varies: Robinson uses the term ‘[s]mart objects–
devices with sensing, processing and communication abilities’.26  Manwaring and Clarke attempt 
to move away from the potential limitation attended on the phrase ‘internet of things’, and in 
doing so provide a coherent and expansive concept – eObjects: ‘An eObject is an object that is 
not inherently computerised, but into which has been embedded one or more computer 
processors with data-collection, data-handling and data communication capabilities.’27  They 
note though that even this definition is incomplete, and stress that eObjects can be ‘nested within 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ownership’ (2014) Intellectual Property Forum 25; Robinson, ‘Patent Law Challenges’, above n 21, 659: with the 
internet of things ‘technology will rely heavily on software’. 
25
 See eg DR Desai and GN Magliocca ‘Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things’ (2014) 
102 Geo LJ 1691; D Mendis ‘“The Clone Wars’: Episode 1 - The Rise of 3D Printing and its Implications for 
Intellectual Property Law: Learning Lessons from the Past?” [2013] 35 EIPR 155. 
26
 Robinson, ‘Patent Law Challenges’, above n 21, 662.  Hon, Millard and Singh, ‘Twenty Legal Considerations for 
Clouds of Things’, above n 23, 5-8 simply uses the term ‘Thing’, which is followed in G N La Diega and I Walden, 
‘Contracting for the “Internet of Things”: Looking into the Nest’ (1 February 2016) Queen Mary School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 219/2016, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725913.  
27
 K Manwaring and R Clarke, ‘Surfing the third wave of computing: a framework for research into networked 
eObjects’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 586, 599. 
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a larger object, or elements of a larger, distributed system.’28  They also emphasise the 
potentially enormous range of attribute that can be ascribed to eObjects, which necessarily give 
rise to many different legal issues.
29
 This concept of eObjects is valuable in demonstrating the 
breadth of impact of technological change, but as a terminology it arguably suffers from being 
overly broad.  What can be drawn though from these discussions is the recognition of the 
impossibility of simply treating the tangible and the intangible as analytically distinct.  
Regardless of terminology – internet of things, integrated goods, eObjects – what is clear is the 
increasing irrelevance of attempts to draw distinct lines as between software and hardware. 
These changes suggest the possibility of a paradigm shift in the nature of production and 
consumption,
30
 but there is also a complex contradiction.  On one hand, the integrated nature of 
novel technologies enables greater autonomy, in terms of operational capacity (consider the 
massive interest in autonomous cars, and artificial intelligence and robotics generally),
31
 and 
‘[e]merging technologies frequently eliminate the capacity-limiting constraints common in the 
previous technological era’.32  However, the technical capacity to remotely control the use of 
goods may negatively impact on implicit social values about the extent of such use,
33
 as well as 
questions arising from the use of private and/or commercial information generated by such 
devices.  The growing potential difficulty of the integration of goods and IPRs is exemplified by 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid at 601. 
30
 Cf Robinson, ‘Patent Law Challenges’, above n 21, 661: the internet of things ‘is a paradigm shift from Internet 
Age technology.’ 
31
 See eg http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33978561 (September 2015) (various articles considering the 
impact of intelligent machines). 
32
 See eg H Surden ‘Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property’ (2013) 27 Harvard J of L & Tech 135 at 
138. 
33
 Ibid at 178-182.  See also Desai ‘The New Steam’, above n 20 at 1481: ‘as soon as digitization offers a method of 
control, it will be exerted.’  See further JP Liu ‘Paracopyright – A peculiar right to control access’ and S Dusollier 
‘The protection of technological measures: Much abo about nothing of silent remodelling of copyright?’ in RC 
Dreyfuss and JC Ginsburg (eds) Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP (Cambridge: CUP, 
2014) chs 11-12. 
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an as yet un-litigated dispute in the US.  In April 2015, Wired published a story concerning John 
Deere claiming that purchasers of tractors were mere licensees due to the presence of software 
(arguably rendering the tractor a prime example of integrated goods).
34
  The contradiction 
between the exclusionary purposes of IPRs and how the automatic and operative function of 
integration between software and tangible things entails less exclusion and greater connectivity, 
replicates the tension between regimes focused on tangible assets and information assets (IPRs).  
Integrated goods are poorly served by English law which continues to treat tangible and 
intangible “things” as conceptually distinguishable, leading to division between software and 
goods.
35
  This problem is exacerbated by the complicated structure of IPRs that has developed to 
protect software.
36
  This creates serious challenges in terms of secured financing, which is 
divided in its treatment of goods and IPRs.  This division is explored in the following section, 
but it is worth briefly noting the potential consequences of this division.  By providing different 
regimes for the granting or acquisition of security over IPRs or tangibles, English law struggles 
to provide a coherent doctrine for effective utilisation of secured credit as a financing mechanism 
for the development of either IPRs that are used in or with goods or, potentially more 
importantly, for integrated goods themselves.  These difficulties have also plagued other 
systems, such as that in the US, where the literature on this topic is much more substantial, with 
Lipson suggesting fifteen years ago that:  
 
                                                 
34
 K Wiens, ‘We Can’t Let John Deere Destroy the Very Idea of Ownership’ (21 April 2015) Wired Business, 
available at http://www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/. 
35
 For a valuable overview of the debates in this area, and a provocative suggestion to resolve the debate, see eg S 
Green and D Saidov, ‘Software as Goods’ [2007] JBL 161.  See also K Moon, ‘The nature of computer programs: 
Tangible? Goods? Personal Property? Intellectual Property?’ [2009] 31 EIPR 396; A Marsoof, ‘Digital content and 
the definition dilemma under the Sale of Goods Act 1979: Will the Consumer Rights Bill 2013 remedy the malady?’ 
(2014) 9 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 285. 
36
 See eg D Rowland, U Kohl and A Charlesworth Information Technology Law (Abingdon: Routledge 2012) ch 10. 
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the “big case” … will probably not involve pure information technology assets, such as 
software or data.  Rather, the case … will go something like this: A debtor will grant a 
security interest in items of equipment or inventory which contain embedded computer 
programs.
37
 
 
Whilst this “big case” has seemingly yet to emerge in either English or US law, there are 
instances where the problematic relationship between IPRs and goods might give cause for 
concern.  Later in this article, the contemporary problems facing purchasers of goods subject to 
IPRs as well as the implications of the exclusion of purchasers of fully-digital assets from 
exhaustion or “first sale” protection as against IPRs holders are considered.38   
The potential of new technologies integrating tangibles and intangibles necessitates a 
radical approach to avoid this “big case”.  Whilst it is accepted that novel technologies such as 
integrated goods may well be sufficiently served (regulated) by current legal regimes in a 
number of circumstances,
39
 this is not the case with the current regimes of secured finance.
40
 It 
would be an absurd situation were one party may have a security interest over goods, whilst 
another party may have a security interest over the IP governing the software that makes the 
goods actually work (especially if the software is purchased from an unconnected manufacturer), 
and a third party may possibly have a security interest over the integrated goods as a whole 
(purporting to cover both the tangible and intangible assets).  The difficulties arising from this 
                                                 
37
 Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1 at 1121 n 286. 
38
 Below text following n 204. 
39
 K Manwaring, ‘A legal analysis of socio-technological change arising out of eObjects’ (5 January 2016) UNSW 
Law Research Paper No. 2016-15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690024.   
40
 There is no mention of this issue in e.g. Manwaring and Clarke, ‘Surfing the third wave of computing’, above n 
27; Manwaring, ‘A legal analysis of socio-technological change arising out of eObjects’, above n 39.  Hon, Millard 
and Singh, ‘Twenty Legal Considerations for Clouds of Things’, above n 23, 15-17, and La Diega and Walden, 
‘Contracting for the “Internet of Things”’, above n 26, 7 indicate various potential issues concerning ownership and 
control but not the problems concerning security interests discussed here. 
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relatively simple situation are exacerbated by the susceptibility of integrated goods to variations 
in the level and availability of security over different types of IPRs.  Yet this is the position in 
English law.  As such, the extremely poor state of the current English law requires a cultural leap 
and the development of a new commercial law.
41
  This new commercial law should treat IPRs 
and goods as analogous for the purposes of secured financing.  Taking this cultural leap shifts the 
focus away from the ownership or title (and control thereof) of IPRs or goods (away also from 
the complex arguments over the nature of software).  Instead, focusing on the manner by which 
the security interest gains and maintains protection ie registration, is what this article proposes. 
PROTECTION OF SECURITY OVER IPRS IN ENGLISH LAW 
This article proceeds on the basis that IPRs vary considerably in their characterisation and in the 
way they are protected,
42
 and that IPRs are incredibly important in the modern (national, 
regional, international) economy not just in themselves,
43
 but because of their interaction and 
interconnection with goods.  This article also proceeds on the basis that ‘security [is] a fact of 
                                                 
41
 This article will not be covering consumer law issues either generally or in light of the Consumer Rights Act 
2015, not least because the obligation to have the right to supply digital content (s 41) is functionally identical to 
SGA s12.  It is also noted that whilst the definition of ‘digital content’ in s 2(9) of that Act would align that concept 
with the notion of embedded software, it continues the increasingly dated delineation of goods and software.   
42
 Lipton ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’, above n 11 at 287-300 (whilst there are significant differences 
between IPRs, there are three broad groups: (1) copyrights, patents and trade marks; (2) sui generis statutory IP, 
such as design rights and semiconductor topography rights; and (3) quasi-IP, such as trade secrets, confidential 
information, domain names, and unregistered trade marks).  This article focuses on the first group, but the other 
types are considered on an ad hoc basis.  See also eg X-TN Nguyen ‘Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: 
The Trouble with Perfection – Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset’ (2002) 59 Wash & Lee L Rev 37 
(arguing that domain names can and should be subject to security interests).  For the substantive meaning and 
content of IP law, the reader is directed towards the standard texts on IP. 
43
 WJ Murphy and T Ward ‘Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property’ (2001-02) 41 IDEA 297 at 301; I Davies ‘Secured Financing of Intellectual Property Assets and the 
Reform of English Personal Property Security Law’ (2006) 26 OJLS 559 at 576; M Elliot ‘IP Creates Jobs for 
America’ Global Intellectual Property Centre (25 May 2012) at http://tinyurl.com/npq77g9.  See further I Davies 
‘Patent Grants, Signals and Commodification: A Legal Dilemma?’ in I Davies (ed) Issues in International 
Commercial Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) at 53-61 (assessing the correlation between patent grants and economic 
activity); M Bridge, Personal Property Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th ed, 2015) at 14: the importance of IPRs 
‘can barely be overestimated in modern commercial conditions’. 
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life.’44  This article thus considers three interconnected areas of difficulty in the field of security 
interests over IPRs: practical problems, the conceptualisation of security interests in IPRs, and 
problems concerning multiple registration. 
Practical problems 
At the outset it is necessary to set aside practical problems concerning the determination of 
ownership of IPRs (particularly as certain IPRs are subject to challenge)
45
 or their valuation.
46
  
Although significant, such problems exist regardless of the method of financing utilised.  A more 
profound practical difficulty concerns the limitations on control over intangible assets,
47
 as the 
lack of possible repossession and liquidation of duplicable intangibles appears to render any 
security worthless.
48
  Conversely, repossession of a tangible medium in order to control 
embedded IPRs may impose unacceptable costs on the creditor.
49
  However, the lack of a right to 
repossess may be mitigated by rights of control, which for software may be particularly valuable 
even if it may actually only exist as a threat rather than a practical reality.
50
  So whilst further 
                                                 
44
 AL Diamond A Review of Security Interests in Property (London: HMSO 1989) at para 8.1.5. 
45
 See eg Davies, ‘Secured Financing of Intellectual Property Assets’, above n 43 at 574-575; LA Heymann 
‘Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights versus Selection of Remedies’ (2013) 17 Stan Tech 
L Rev 241.  See also eg ‘The Government’s Response to the Law Commission’s Report (Law Com 346) “Patents, 
Trade Marks and Design Rights: Groundless Threats”’ at http://tinyurl.com/kytt7t3; Law Commission, Patents, 
Trade Marks and Design Rights: Groundless Threats (London: Law Com No 346, 2014). 
46
 Lipton ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’, above n 11 at 303; RJ Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software 
Financing’ (1999-2000) 85 Cornell L Rev 134 at 139. 
47
 Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 281 (not possible to exercise a lien over an 
electronic database), following OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 
48
 Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software Financing’, above n 46 at 177-179.   
49
 RJ Mann ‘Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt’ (1997) 96 Michigan L Rev 159 at 181 
50
 Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software Financing’, above n 46 at 178 fn 178.  Termination of the use of software by 
a seller may infringe the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 12(2)(b): Rubicon Computer Systems Ltd v United Paints Ltd 
(2000) 2 TCLR 453.  The position of secured parties is unclear in this case. 
 Page 12 of 52 
 
research into the actual practical operation of IP financing is necessary,
51
 it also remains the case 
that conceptual problems have been and remain unresolved.
52
 
Conceptual problems 
Characterising IPRs raises difficult conceptual questions.
53
  IPRs look like choses in action,
54
 
and some IPRs might well be,
55
  but other IPRs such as patents are explicitly not.
56
  
Nevertheless, the “main” IPRs – patents, copyright, trade marks, and registered designs – are 
property rights.
57
  However, untangling the relationship between registration and the proprietary 
status of some IPRs,
58
 and ascertaining a sufficient (legal or equitable) proprietary interest in 
                                                 
51
 Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1 at 1156-1157.  See also eg M Bezant ‘The Use of 
Intellectual Property as Security for Debt Finance’ (1998) 1 Journal of Knowledge Management 237 at 253; Ghosh 
‘The Morphing of Property Rules’, above n 15 at 103; Townend Using Intellectual Property as Security, above n 5 
at 30. 
52
 See eg S Weinberger ‘Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The Peregrine Effect on the Orion Pictures 
Plan of Reorganization’ (1993) 11 Cardozo Arts and Ent LJ 959 (noting how the fallout from the Orion Pictures 
bankruptcy demonstrates the negative impact of a lack of conceptual clarity). 
53
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 94 fn 15 (noting the considerable academic 
debate in the 1890s concerning the nature of IP); Lipton ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’, above n 11 at 
301: ‘it makes little conceptual sense to take a legal or equitable mortgage or charge over computer software per se 
as distinct from, say, the copyright in the software’. 
54
 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 430 (Channel J): choses in action are ‘all personal rights of property 
which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical possession’. 
55
 Your Response Ltd, above n 47 at [26] (Moore-Bick LJ): the decision in Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App 
Cas 426 ‘makes it very difficult to accept that the common law recognises the existence of intangible property other 
than choses in action (apart from patents, which are subject to statutory classification)’.   
56
 Patents Act 1977, s 30(1).  Cf Townend Using Intellectual Property as Security, above n 5 at 18; Davies ‘Patent 
Grants, Signals and Commodification’, above n 43 at 61 (both suggesting that, functionally, patents are choses in 
action). 
57
 Patents Act 1977, s 30; Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90(1); Trade Marks Act 1994, s 24; 
Registered Designs Act 1949, s 19.  The following discussion will only cover patents and trade marks, however, 
registered designs appear to have the same basic structure, and thus the same potential flaws, with regard to security: 
Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at paras 14.72–
14.76. 
58
 Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 315: ‘This [the proprietary nature of such IPRs] is the effect 
of registration.’  Cf C Mulligan ‘A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property’ (2013) 80 Tenn L Rev 235 
at 252-255: one of the consequences of the lack of a coherent numerus clausus principle for IPRs is the capacity in 
IP law for prohibitions on alienation to develop. 
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some IPRs,
59
 is complicated and creates difficulties for the English security interests regime 
which functions by manipulating such concepts.  Although these complications spoil any façade 
of elegance, it appears possible (if not necessarily certain) to obtain present and future security 
interests in the main IPRs. 
Under the Patents Act 1977 it is possible to assign or mortgage a patent,
60
 and the mortgage 
is by assignment (it is not a true legal mortgage as that would imply the impossible: a right to 
possession).
61
  An assignment may be equitable, in which case a mere intention to transfer the 
relevant interest suffices,
62
 but in either case the assignment or mortgage of a patent will be ‘void 
unless it is in writing and is signed by or on behalf of the assignor or mortgagor’.63  This 
formality rule must be seen in light of the obligation to register a patent mortgage in the patents 
register as soon as is practicable,
64
 but it is unclear whether registration is necessary to create the 
mortgage.
65
  The important decision of the Court of Appeal in Van Gelder, Apsimon and Co Ltd 
v The Sowerby Bridge Flour Society Ltd sets out that the mortgagor of an IPR has to be treated 
the same as the mortgagor of any other property.
66
  As Tosato correctly notes,
67
 the registration 
practices that distinguished assignees from mortgagees in IPRs, which influenced the Court of 
                                                 
59
 Lipton ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’, above n 11 at 300.  As to the necessity of including in a 
mortgage agreement those quasi-IPRs in order to cover them, see Henry ‘Mortgages of intellectual property’, above 
n 7 at 161-163.  It is difficult to see how the proposed EU Directive on protecting trade secrets will provide any 
clarity on this issue: see eg http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/trade_secrets/index_en.htm. 
60
 Patents Act 1977, s 30(2). 
61
 This may be the best way of explaining the Patents Act 1977, s 30(2): ‘Subject to section 36(3) below, any patent 
or any such application, or any right in it, may be assigned or mortgaged.’ 
62
 Swiss Bank v Lloyds Bank [1982] AC 584 at 613 (Lord Wilberforce).  See further eg Gorringe v Irwell India 
Rubber Works (1886) LR 34 ChD 128; William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454; 
Baxter International Inc v Nederlands Produktielaboratorium voor Bloedtransfusiapparatuur BV [1998] RPC 250. 
63
 s 30(6). 
64
 Patent Rules 2007, SI 2007/3291, r 44(6); Patents Act 1977, s 33(3)(b). 
65
 Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at para 14.61. 
66
 (1890) 44 ChD 374.  As to the possible problems arising due to confusion between a charge and a mortgage, see 
eg Henry ‘Mortgages of intellectual property’, above n 7.  However, as a result of changes to the Companies Act 
2006, for which see text to n 106,  these problems may be less relevant now in that particular context.   
67
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 96-97. 
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Appeal, has not really changed and also applies in the trade mark context.  This would seem to 
be a practical mechanism to avoid problems concerning transfers of title to IPRs, and may 
support Bromfield and Runeckles’s argument that the most effective method of gaining security 
is taking a fixed charge over registered IP.
68
  However, this does not deal with the fact that only 
an equitable mortgage can cover future property.
69
  In the event of an equitable mortgage over a 
patent, this may also be registerable.
70
   
A combination of the Patents Act 1977 and the Patent Rules 2007 may enable registration of 
a charge, as distinct from a mortgage.  Rule 44(6) of the Patent Rules 2007 states that ‘a notice of 
any transaction, instrument or event mentioned in [the Patents Act 1977] section 32(2)(b) or 
33(3) must be entered in the register as soon as practicable after it occurs (or, if later, when the 
application is published).’  Section 32(2)(b) of the 1977 Act provides for rules to govern ‘the 
registration of transactions, instruments or events affecting rights in or under patents and 
applications’.  Section 33(3) states those transactions to which provisions on the effect of 
registration apply:  
 
(a) the assignment or assignation of a patent or application for a patent, or a right in it; (b) 
the mortgage of a patent or application or the granting of security over it; (c) the grant, 
assignment or assignation of a licence or sub-licence, or mortgage of a licence or sub-
licence, under a patent or application   
 
                                                 
68
 Bromfield and Runeckles ‘Taking security over intellectual property’, above n 16 at 346. 
69
 In such a case, the mortgagor holds the future property on trust for the mortgagee: Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 
HL Cas 191, 11 ER 999. 
70
 Patents Act 1977, s 32(2)(b). 
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For Beale et al, this would be sufficient to cover a charge,
71
 but the lack of specific reference to a 
charge requires an inelegant combination of reliance on the phrase ‘or the granting of security 
over it’ in section 33(3)(b) and the apparent possibility of obtaining equitable title,72 to reach this 
conclusion.  Further incoherence surrounds preparatory acts: an application to register a 
mortgage is treated the same as a mortgage,
73
 but an agreement to assign is not within the 
meaning of an assignment for the purposes of section 33(3)(a) of the Patents Act 1977.
74
   
A registered trade mark can be subject to a legal mortgage,
75
 or assigned by way of 
security.
76
  The formalities of assignment noted above apply here also.  Additionally, ‘the grant 
of a licence under a registered trade mark’ and ‘the granting of any security interest (whether 
fixed or floating) over a registered trade mark or any right in or under it’, are also registerable 
transactions.
77
  This is clear evidence of the possibility of registration of equitable charges.
78
  As 
with patents, a mere application for a trade mark can be subject to these provisions.
79
  The 
reforming effect of the Trade Marks Act 1994 is clear: it ‘emancipated registered trade marks 
from the tyranny of transactional formalism and enabled them to be use in all manner of 
                                                 
71
 Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at para 14.62. 
72
 Baxter, above n 62.  Cf Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper, above n 10 at [7.25]: the Patents Act 1977, s 
33 ‘is not easy to understand and we are not sure that we do understand it.’ 
73
 Patents Act 1977, s 33(4). 
74
 Coflexip Stena Offshore Ltd’s Patent [1997] RPC 179 at 188.  It is tentatively suggested that this problem may be 
a reason for the apparently limited demand for, or supply of, debt financing at the early stage of IP development (as 
noted by Bezant ‘The Use of Intellectual Property as Security for Debt Finance’, above n 51 at 239). 
75
 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 24(5).  There may be pragmatic reasons why a financier would not want to become a 
legal mortgagee: see eg R Burrell and M Handler, ‘The PPSA and Registered Trade Marks: When Bureaucratic 
Systems Collide’ (2011) 34 UNSW LJ 600 at 617. 
76
 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 24(1), (4).  This altered the previous position: Holly Hobbie Trade Mark [1984] RPC 
329 (HL). 
77
 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 25(2)(b), (c). 
78
 Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at 14.68. 
79
 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 27(3). 
 Page 16 of 52 
 
commercial activity.’80  Whilst this reform provided some legislatively-created conceptual 
clarity, difficulties with the registration system per se remain and are illustrated below.  
Section 90(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 states: ‘Copyright is 
transmissible by assignment, by testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as personal or 
moveable property.’  This phraseology appears to suggest that, as with patents, copyright must 
be mortgaged by assignment, and if so then the issues concerning such assignments of patents 
and registered trade marks apply here also.
81
  Allen and Overy, in their submission to the 
Hargreaves Review, stated this was an unpopular financing mechanism, and criticised it as 
complex and disadvantageous for copyright owners.
82
  However, unlike the statutory provisions 
for patents, there is some clarity on the status of security over future copyright:  
 
Where by an agreement made in relation to future copyright, and signed by or on behalf of 
the prospective owner of the copyright, the prospective owner purports to assign the future 
copyright (wholly or partially) to another person, then if, on the copyright coming into 
existence, the assignee or another person claiming under him would be entitled as against all 
other persons to require the copyright to be vested in him, the copyright shall vest in the 
assignee or his successor in title by virtue of this subsection.
83
 
 
Therefore, legal mortgages by assignment of copyright (whether future or present) appear 
possible.  It also appears possible to have an implied agreement to assign, taking effect by means 
                                                 
80
 J Phillips, ‘Intellectual property as security for debt finance – a time to advance?’ (1997) 19 EIPR 276 at 276. 
81
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90(3): to be effective an assignment must be signed by or on behalf of 
the assignor. 
82
 http://tinyurl.com/mql4pjy. 
83
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 91(1); Performing Rights Society Ltd v B4U Network (Europe) Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 3010 (Ch), [2013] FSR 19. 
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of a trust for the assignee.
84
  However, the absence of a copyright register necessitates a licence-
based approach to dealing with the transfer of title involved in a legal mortgage.  Tosato argues 
that the grant of an exclusive licence by the mortgagee can allow the mortgagor to deal with and 
prevent disposition of the copyright.
85
  Whilst prima facie attractive, proprietary matters would 
thus be dealt with as if merely personal interests, and problems concerning notice and third 
parties would not be resolved (due to the absence of an appropriate register).  More problematic 
still is that the licence approach limits the viability of multiple sequential security interests, and 
restricting copyright securitisation to a single creditor does not make much commercial sense. 
 What then is the impact for integrated goods of these conceptual complications over 
IPRs?  If such goods contain software, operating a patented process to produce a trademarked 
object (a rough description of a 3D printer), then it may be possible to take (or grant) security 
over the tangible goods under that regime (eg a fixed or floating charge) but it is not necessarily 
the case for the IPRs.  Also if a change in or to an IPRs-protected element (of which integrated 
goods necessarily have vast and complex collections) occurs (eg a software upgrade), then it may 
be unclear whether a secured financier has priority over the IPRs holders, let alone the 
difficulties for other parties in a chain of transactions involving integrated goods. Moreover, 
these questions are multiplied (thus increasing costs) in light of the differences between systems 
for different IPRs.  Integrated goods are thus objects of greater than usual conceptual flux: 
interests (ie IPRs) operate under different regimes, may come into being and disappear through 
various direct and indirect, formal and informal actions.  This makes difficult any attempts at 
low-cost determination of rights (for further commercial purposes).  However, it is suggested 
that the real difficult is not conceptual: what is the case for IPRs is broadly the same for goods 
                                                 
84
 See eg Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2005] EWCA Civ 11, [2005] FSR 31. 
85
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 97. 
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with regard to the conceptual murkiness of secured transactions regimes in English law.  And in 
both cases the conceptual problems can be nullified by an appropriate registration regime.  Yet as 
will now be shown, inconsistency and incoherence within and lack of coordination between 
multiple regimes mean that English law cannot meet this standard. 
Problems with registration 
It has already been seen how registration plays an important role in the creation and protection of 
certain IPRs, but registration requirements and benefits are inconsistent across the field of 
IPRs.
86
  There is also a disconnection between registration as an IPR, and registration of a 
security interest over a particular IPR.
87
  Registration of a patent mortgage is not compulsory, 
nor is it a perfection requirement, but it does preserve priority,
88
 and the same appears to be the 
case with trade marks.
89
  However, for patents as well as trade marks, the extent of the notice 
effect of registration is unclear, because of the overlapping relationship with the registration 
scheme set out under the Companies Act 2006.
90
  First though, the complex operation and 
unclear effect of the patents register will be explored. 
                                                 
86
 cf Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 98: ‘invisibility and blind spots must be 
considered inherent flaws of these registration systems.’  See also Patents Act 1977, s 72; Trade Marks Act 1994 ss 
46-47: the patent or trade mark can be de-registered. 
87
 In Scottish law, the ‘standard view’ is that ‘unless and until there is registration [of IPRs], the grantee has only a 
personal right.  So no security can exist before registration’, but it is possible for there to be unregistered security 
though such security ‘lives a precarious life.’  Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper, above n 10 at [7.27]. 
88
 Patents Act 1977, s 33(1).  As noted in Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based 
Financing, above n 9 at para 14.66, it is unclear whether this rule would apply if the later charge was also 
unregistered, but the submission therein that the common law rule that equitable charges rank in order of creation 
would be a simple and acceptable solution here.   
89
 Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at 14.69-14.71. 
90
 See eg Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 316.  Such registration may provide constructive 
notice sufficient to satisfy the knowledge element of the priority scheme set out in the Patents Act 1977, but this is 
not entirely clear: Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 
at 14.65: ‘It is possible that, in this context, “know” may include having constructive notice’ (emphasis added). 
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According to section 32(9) of the Patents Act 1977, the register of patents is ‘prima facie 
evidence of anything required or authorised [by the Patents Act or rules thereto] to be 
registered’,91 which has the effect of prioritising registered transactions, ie mortgages or 
assignments.  But, ‘[r]egistration is not equivalent to legal title.’92  So a later transaction takes 
priority over an earlier unregistered transaction,
93
 and ‘[t]hus, a bona fide purchaser without 
notice of some unregistered defect in the title which he has acquired is likely to retain ownership 
despite that defect.’94  The lack of certainty over ownership is troubling, as is the fact that whilst 
knowledge or notice is key,
95
 it is unclear whether constructive notice suffices.
96
  Equally unclear 
is whether there is an obligation to inspect the patent file and not merely the register entry.
97
  It is 
also unclear whether the later transaction must itself be registered to take priority over the earlier 
unregistered transaction.
98
   
                                                 
91
 Fraser v Oystertec [2003] EWHC 2787 (Pat Ct), [2004] FSR (22) at 446 (Peter Prescott QC) 
92
 ibid. 
93
 Patents Act 1977, s 33(1).  The effect of failure to register is set out in s 68, which is ‘not a very well thought-out 
piece of legislation’: Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd (No 2) [2011] EWCA Civ 927, [2012] FSR (2) at para 29 (Sir 
Robin Jacob).  See also LG Electronics v NCR Financial Solutions Group Ltd [2003] FSR (24) (Pat Ct) at para 18 
(Jacob J): ‘People need to know who is on the register.  This section is aimed at making the people who own the 
monopolies get on the register.  If they do not, they lose their right to damages and they do not have a right to sell 
the right to damages to someone else.’  The decision of the Supreme Court in Schütz on s 68 is partially obiter and 
thus the true meaning of that section remains to be determined: CIPA Guide to the Patents Act (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 7th ed, 2011) at para 68.02. 
94
 CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 33.03. 
95
 Transfer Systems v International Consultants BL 0/1/05, cited in CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 33.04. 
96
 cf In Morey’s Patent (1858) 25 Beav 581, 53 ER 759; Bridge, Gullifer, McMeel, and Worthington The Law of 
Personal Property, above n 8 at para 36-029 (the facts of Morey’s Patent suggest there was actual notice). 
97
 CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 33.04. 
98
 ibid at para 33.03: ‘The later transaction, instrument or event need not itself be registered, but will only take effect 
as against subsequent transactions when notice of it has been given to the public by an application to register it.’  
Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at para 14.66 
(noting that s 33 might be interpreted as only applying to registered mortgages).  See also Bridge, Gullifer, McMeel, 
and Worthington The Law of Personal Property, above n 8 at para 36-029, noting potential problems of circularity.  
Contrast Finecard International Ltd v Urquhart Dyke & Lord [2005] EWHC 2481 (Ch), [2006] FSR (27) at 511 
(Peter Smith J): ‘The purpose of [Patents Act 1977, s 33] is to provide that priority as between persons who claim to 
have acquired the property in a patent shall be regulated by the priority according to registration.’ 
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The Patent Rules provide further detail: the application to register inter alia an assignment or 
mortgage must ‘include evidence establishing the transaction, instrument or event.’99  The 
Chartered Institute of Patent Attorney’s Guide to the Patent Act 1977 (‘CIPA Guide’) states that 
‘[i]t is not essential for [Patent Form 21]100 to be accompanied by any further evidence of the 
transaction, instrument or event provided that this form is signed at Pt 7 by, or on behalf of, all 
parties in the case of an assignment, or by (or on behalf of) the grantor alone in the case of a 
mortgage, licence, sub-licence or security.’101  The implication of a distinction between 
assignment and security (which thus implies that assignment is something other than a security 
transaction), and the suggestion that a charge (as distinct from a mortgage) over a patent is 
possible,
102
 illustrates a disconnection with doctrine.  Moreover, the different obligations with 
regard to signatures depending on whether there is an assignment or other type of security 
transaction, does not seem to be based on the doctrine set out in the Patent Act 1977 itself.  
Another comment in the CIPA Guide gives rise to further concerns:  
 
If there has been a chain of successive assignments, fees can be saved by seeking to register 
only the final transaction in the chain.  However, signatures for all the parties, or copies of 
each of the assignments, will need to be produced in order to satisfy the Comptroller of the 
entitlement of the ultimate assignee to be registered as proprietor.  However, if that is done, 
the intermediate “links” in the chain will not be recorded in the register.103 
 
                                                 
99
 Patent Rules 2007, r 47(1)(b). 
100
 On which the application to register the transaction must be made: Patent Rules 2007, r 47(1)(a). 
101
 CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 32.26. 
102
 See above n 72. 
103
 CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 32.26. 
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If this is so future purchasers face considerable difficulty in mapping out the chain of financing 
transactions with sufficient clarity to determine with any reasonable certainty whether title is 
clean.
104
  This difficulty specifically concerns the patent regime, yet further potential costs and 
risks arise depending on the corporate personality of the parties.  
Registration is necessary under the Companies Act 2006 regime if the security is granted by 
a company.  However, in April 2013,
105
 chapters 1 and 2 of Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006 
were repealed and replaced with new section 859A-Q.  Under the previous iteration, by virtue 
section 860(7)(i) of the Companies Act 2006, it was possible to register ‘a charge on goodwill or 
on any intellectual property.’  Section 860(4) of the 2006 Act stated that ‘[f]or the purposes of 
section 860(7)(i), “intellectual property” means (a) any patent, trade mark, registered design, 
copyright or design right; (b) any licence under or in respect of any such right.’  This obviously 
covered both types of IPR, ie those “registerable” and “unregisterable” under their own specialist 
schemes. 
Under the new iteration, all charges (which covers mortgages
106
) are registerable.
107
  This 
would be the functional equivalent of old section 860(7)(i): the general must include the specific.  
However, clarification of registration of charges over IP must be drawn from new section 859D, 
which sets out the particulars for charges that must be sent to the Registrar, by either the 
company or a person interested in the charge (section 859A(2)).  Thus if a charge is ‘created or 
                                                 
104
 This aspect is partially mitigated by the existence of an Assignment Index for patents, held at the British Library, 
which provides a record of assignments and mortgages.  See CIPA Guide, above n 93 at para 32.34.  
105
 The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/600.  For an overview, see eg --, 
‘Revised system of registration of company charges comes into force – at last’ [2013] Company Law Newsletter 1. 
106
 Companies Act 2006, s 859A(7). 
107
 There are three exceptions: Companies Act 2006, s 859A(1); (6): a charge in favour of a landlord on a cash 
deposit given as a security in connection with the lease of land; a charge created by a member of Lloyd’s to secure 
its obligations in connection with its underwriting business at Lloyd’s; and a charge excluded by or under any other 
Act. 
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evidenced by an instrument’,108 it must contain inter alia details as to ‘whether (and if so, a short 
description of) any … intellectual property that is registered or required to be registered in the 
United Kingdom, is subject to a charge (which is not a floating charge) or fixed security included 
in the instrument’.109  If the charge is not created or evidenced by an instrument,110 then the 
particulars merely need to provide inter alia ‘the nature of the charge’, ‘a short description of the 
property … charged’ and ‘the obligations secured by the charge’.111  The definition of IP given 
in old section 860(4) is replicated verbatim.
112
  It may be argued that this change does not alter 
the regime for registration of a company charge as against IPRs.  If so, then a potentially 
significant gap still exists with regard to the granting of security over IPRs by unincorporated 
organisations, which are not covered by the Companies Act 2006 regime.  The granting of 
security over ‘personal chattels’ by unincorporated organisations is covered by the Bills of Sale 
Acts 1878-91,
113
 but the Bills of Sale Acts cannot cover IPRs, not least because such assets must 
be ‘capable of complete transfer by delivery’.114  Consequently, an unincorporated organisation 
will be unable to grant a registerable security interest under either the Companies Act or Bills of 
Sale Act regimes, and may also be prevented from registering such an IPR in a specialist register.   
Another problem unaddressed by the new system is the position regarding non-registerable 
IPRs.  Is the definition of IP in the Act as including copyright redundant, since copyright is not 
                                                 
108
 Companies Act 2006, s 859D(1)(c). 
109
 Companies Act 2006, s 859D(2)(d). 
110
 Companies Act 2006, s 859D(1)(d). 
111
 Companies Act 2006, s 859D(3)(c)-(e). 
112
 Companies Act 2006, s 859D(5).  This means, in essence, that the current register is no different to the 1928 
version, which is of course ‘unfortunate’: J de Lacy ‘Reflections on the Ambit and Reform of Part 12 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and the Doctrine of Constructive Notice’ in J de Lacy (ed) The Reform of United Kingdom 
Company Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2002) 333 at 337. 
113
 See generally Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at 
ch 11. 
114
 Bills of Sale Act 1878, s 4.  It appears that this issue will not be resolved by the proposed reforms to the Bills of 
Sale regime: Law Commission, Bills of Sale: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP 225, September 2015) [8.19] 
(excluding IPRs from the reform proposals). 
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‘registered or required to be registered in the United Kingdom’?  If the just-quoted phrase is 
strictly interpreted, then it would appear that the inclusion of copyright in the definition of IP can 
only be relevant for those charges that are not created or evidenced by an instrument.  
Furthermore, the non-comprehensive definition of IP for the purpose of the general registration 
regime obviously means certain types of IPR, such as database rights, are not registerable.
115
  
Additional problems may arise due to the nature of that which is registered in the general 
register: if a security interest over copyright is registerable in the general register it will most 
likely be the sort that is not evidenced or created by an instrument (due to the absence of 
registration for copyright qua copyright).  Consequently, such details of the copyright that are 
provided may necessitate what Tosato called ‘extensive due diligence’,116 but what may more 
accurately be called excessive due diligence, up the chain of title.  Thus as was also the case with 
the specific register for patents, downstream purchasers will face difficulties in ascertaining the 
presence of security interests. 
The presence of specialist registers for IPRs is often treated as justification for restricting the 
coverage of a general scheme of registerable security interests.
117
  Thus in the Law Commission 
Consultative Report on company security interests, registerable IPRs would be outside the 
proposed scheme, as the specialist registration mechanisms existing for IPRs would suffice.
118
  
                                                 
115
 Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 315. 
116
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 100. 
117
 ibid at 100: ‘The absence of a specialist register, combined with the compulsory registration and the priority rules 
that govern the CA, renders taking security over a copyright owned by a company one of the most palatable IPRs to 
use as collateral.’ 
118
 Law Commission Company Security Interests: A Consultative Report (London: Law Com CP 176, 2004) paras. 
2.20; 2.48; 2.50-2.51.  This followed from the same suggestion in the Consultative Paper: Law Commission 
Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges and Property other than Land (London: Law Com CP 164, 
2002) para 4.211.  Cf Security Interests (Jersey) Law 2012, s 4(a)(v): ‘any intellectual property created under the 
law of Jersey other than intellectual property registered on a register of intellectual property in Jersey’ is covered, 
thus potentially setting up distinct regimes for different types of IPRs.  However, it is worth noting that Security 
Interests (Jersey) Law 2012 is the first stage, and the second stage (which will cover tangible movables) will lead to 
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Similarly, UNCITRAL’s 2011 supplement to its legislative guide on secured transactions,119 
concerning security rights in IP, simply involved explaining how the main legislative guide 
would apply in the IP context, and by making on a limited number of ‘asset-specific 
recommendations’.120 Thus neither the Guide nor the Supplement provide a specifically IP-
focused security interests regime, and if there is a conflict between two regimes (ie IPRs and 
security interests), the IP regime is to be preferred and preserved.
121
  The Guide and the 
Supplement both rest on this policy of respecting and retaining an IPRs registry, even if States 
should perhaps be encouraged to consider consolidating such registries.
122
  Indeed, registration in 
a specialised IPRs registry would take priority over registration in a security interests registry.
123
  
The Supplement thus takes the position that IP law will take priority over any general secured 
transactions law.
124
 
However, the Law Commission’s statements conflating the approaches for mobile 
equipment and land with that for IPRs are arguably misleading.
125
  The Law Commission stated 
that 
 
if a lender is really serious about taking security over such an asset [ie and IPR], as opposed 
to just “sweeping it up” together with the rest of the company’s assets in general, it will 
                                                                                                                                                             
the development of a common registration system: Email from Professor Sir Roy Goode to author (20 December 
2014). 
119
 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (New York 2010).  For a valuable analysis, see eg N 
Orkun Akseli International Secured Transactions Law: Facilitation of Credit and International Conventions and 
Instruments (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
120
 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property 
(New York 2011).  For an outline of the development of this supplement, see eg A Tosato ‘The UNCITRAL Annex 
on security rights in IP: a work in progress’ (2009) 4 J of Intel Prop L and Practice 743. 
121
 UNCITRAL, Supplement, above n 120 at [4]. 
122
 ibid at [126]-[129].  Recommendation 4(b) of the Legislative Guide has particular effect here, reinforcing state 
autonomy over the regulation of IP law. 
123
 ibid at [138]. 
124
 ibid at [49]-[52]; [55]; [60]-[63]. 
125
 Law Commission Company Security Interests, above n 118 at paras. 2.51, 3.338. 
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ensure that all the necessary steps are taken to comply with any specialised “asset” 
registration or mortgage registration requirements.  We have been told that this is the case by 
those involved in specialised finance in some of these areas.
126
   
 
Notwithstanding that the final quoted sentence appears to be contracted by Allen and Overy’s 
submission to the Hargreaves Review, it is inappropriate to adopt rationales developed in the 
context of registers for mobile but non-duplicable assets such as mobile equipment,
127
 or those 
developed in the context of immobile real property.  Digitisation means that the content of the 
subject of an IPR is hyper-mobile: it can cross jurisdictional boundaries almost 
instantaneously,
128
 and in doing so digital information is necessarily duplicated,
129
 exacerbating 
the economic problems of non-excludability.  An equally important distinction is that, compared 
to other registers, IP registers do not provide conclusive protection.
130
  The most obvious 
problem though is that unconnected multiple registers create obvious costs and problems for 
third parties in determining what type of IPR they have and thus whether they can register,
131
 as 
                                                 
126
 ibid at para. 3.293. 
127
 See eg R Goode Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and Protocol Thereto on  
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment: Official Commentary (Rome: UNIDROIT, 2008) 1. 
128
 cf JC Lipson ‘Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the Negotiability of Information’ (2002) 63 Ohio St LJ 
1327 at 1412: ‘hyperkinetic information assets.’ 
129
 cf Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1 at 1071: ‘theoretically … security interests in 
information technology assets will travel like a computer virus, encumbering the intellectual property or data in the 
computers of every person or company that has communicated, directly or indirectly – with the debtor.’ 
130
 Townend, Using Intellectual Property as Security, above n 5 at 23: the system for IPRs is akin to the system for 
unregistered land prior to the 1925 reforms: ‘The registers could be said to give a form of notice, but they do not 
offer complete protection and a one-stop scheme.’  See also R Calnan Taking Security (London: Jordans, 3rd ed, 
2013) at para 7.283: ‘registration of security over [registerable IPRs] is different from that for ships and aircraft.  
The [IP] register does not purport to be conclusive.’  See further TM Ward ‘The Perfection and Priority Rules for 
Security Interests in Copyrights, Patents, and Trademarks: The Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed 
Legislative Cures’ (2001) 53 Me L Rev 391 at 394 n7 (making the same point about the US law); Solomons v US 21 
Ct Cl 479 at 483 (1886): IP is ‘closer in analogy to real than to personal estate’ (cited in Murphy and Ward, 
‘Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry’, above n 43 at 481). 
131
 For a brief analysis of this problem, which otherwise tends to be absent in the literature, see eg Henry ‘Mortgages 
of intellectual property’, above n 7 at 163-166.  See also the Allen & Overy submission to the Hargreaves Review 
(http://tinyurl.com/mql4pjy): ‘the security taker must rely on its registration of the security against the IPR owner at 
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well as consequential ascertainment difficulty for third party purchasers.  This was clear with the 
Law Commission’s initial scheme, where a registerable IPR (eg a patent) would be outside the 
Law Commission’s scheme and subject to the specialist registry scheme.  However, if it was 
unregisterable (eg a copyright) it would come within the Law Commission’s scheme, unless it is 
registerable elsewhere in the world.
132
   
Interestingly, the Law Commission’s initial approach was later dropped, in favour of a 
system whereby security interests over IPRs would have to be registered in both the specialist 
registers and in the general security interests register.
133
  This was due to concerns about failures 
to register and difficulties of searching the relevant register with given information; concerns 
about costs of double registration could be outweighed by ‘the information and general peace of 
mind it would bring.’134  If this system had been implemented, the priority rules from the 
specialised registration system (as opposed to the general system) would have applied.
135
  
However, such an approach failed to account for the different effects of registration under the 
different systems.   
Most recently the Scottish Law Commission decided in favour of multiple registration.
136
  
Yet neither Law Commission nor UNCITRAL appeared to have taken into account the US 
experience, which clearly illustrates the significant problems with multiple registration 
                                                                                                                                                             
Companies House.  There is much uncertainty surrounding the effect of this registration as against subsequent bona 
fide purchasers (or licensees) or other interest holders for value without notice, and this affects the attractiveness of 
copyright and other unregistered IPR as a basis for financing.’ 
132
 Law Commission Company Security Interests, above n 118 at para. 3.339.  The problems concerning copyright 
were acknowledged: Law Commission Company Security Interests, above n 118 at para. 3.341. However, no clear 
alternative was suggested. 
133
 Law Commission Company Security Interests (London: Law Com 296, 2005) at paras 3.41, 3.231.  
134
 ibid at para 3.40.   
135
 ibid at para 3.235. 
136
 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper, above n 10 at [19.11]–[19.16], proposal 68.  For criticism, see eg H 
Patrick ‘Reform of security over moveable property: a view from practice’ (2012) 16 Edin LR 272, 276. 
 Page 27 of 52 
 
regimes.
137
  There the consequential academic and practitioner uncertainty, exacerbated by a lack 
of judicial clarity,
138
 has been suggested as the reason for the scarcity of security interests in 
IPRs.
139
  The US experience demonstrates the general dangers of anachronistic and overlapping 
legal structures, even taking into account the peculiarities of the US constitutional structure (and 
the oddity of registered copyright).  More problematic is that no single reform proposal appears 
to have dominated the discussion.  What therefore can be recommended for English law? 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The English law of security interests over IPRs is unnecessarily complex, with multiple distinct 
conceptual structures and registration regimes covering different types of IPRs, and a lack of 
                                                 
137
 The difficult interaction between state and federal registration regimes for IPRs and security interests under the 
Uniform Commercial Code was pointed out in G Gilmore Security Interests in Personal Property vol 1 (Boston, 
MA: Little Brown & Co, MA 1965) at 402.  An enormous volume of work has since been published on the 
relationship between these regimes, and only a brief outline of this literature can be referred to here.  In addition to 
work already cited, further analysis is provided in eg HC Su and MB Weiss ‘Secured Financing of Research and 
Development Using Intellectual Property as Security - Reconciling Article 9 Heuristics with the Patent Law 
Regime’ (1990-91) 13 Geo Mason U L Rev 607; P Heald ‘Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property 
Collateral’ (1993-94) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 135; AA Babaian ‘Striving for Perfection: The Reform 
Proposals for Copyright-Secured Financing’ (1999-2000) 33 Loy L A L Rev 1205; L Brennan ‘Financing 
Intellectual Property under Federal Law: A National Imperative’ (2001) 23 Hastings Communication and Ent LJ 
195; J Sarnelli ‘Grasping for Air: Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Property in an Electronic World’ (2004) 11 
UCLA Entertainment L Rev 103; X-T Nguyen ‘Collateralizing Intellectual Property’ (2007-08) 42 Ga L Rev 1; AG 
Mills ‘Perfecting Security Interests in IP: Avoiding the Traps’ (2008) Banking LJ 746.  Also relevant is the impact 
of the federal bankruptcy law: see eg PS Menell ‘Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An 
Economic Analysis’ (2007) 22 Berkeley Technology LJ 733; ST Schreiner, KB Jordan and NM Lerman ‘Perfecting 
Security Interests in IP: Pitfalls and Bankruptcy Considerations’ (2013) 130 (10) Banking LJ 912; In re 
Transportation Design & Technology, Inc 48 BR 635 (Bankr SD Cal 1985) City Bank and Trust Company v Otto 
Fabric, Inc 83 BR 780 (Bankr D Kan 1998); Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp v Sebro Packaging Corp 143 BR 
360 (Bankr D Md 1992), aff’d 8 F3d 817 (4th Cir 1993)). 
138
 Compare In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd, 116 BR 194 (CD Cal 1990) with In re World Auxiliary Power Co 
303 F3d 1120, 1128 (9th Cir 2002). 
139
 S Danamraj ‘Priority Disputes Involving Security Interests in Patents: Case Law and Current Proposals’ (1993-
94) 2 Tex Intel Prop LJ 257 at 257 (citing J Capwell ‘Secured Financing in Intellectual Property: Perfection of 
Security Interests in Copyrights to Computer Programs’ (1988) 39 Syracruse L Rev 1041 at 1043).  See also A 
Haemmerli ‘Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide’ (1996) 96 Col L Rev 
1645 at 1722; PL Choate ‘Belts, Suspenders, and the Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The Undressing 
of the Contemporary Creditor’ (1997-98) 31 Loy L A L Rev 1415 at 1419.  Cf Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software 
Financing’, above n 46: secured financing of software, of both owned and acquired interests, actually happens. 
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coherence between the IP system(s) and the system(s) governing security over goods.  Any 
reform must ‘put the law in this area into an up to date and coherent form, easier and [make 
it] simpler to understand and operate’,140 and to be successful any proposals must be beneficial 
for practitioners and users of this area of law.
141
  It would be jurisprudential masochism for the 
current reform process to provide a coherent and unified system of security over goods, only for 
a reformed system to falter at the intangible boundary.  Therefore, any reform of the law on 
security over IPRs must be presented as part of a comprehensive reform of security interests in 
personal property, which in turn must simplify the acquisition and protection of security 
interests, increase predictability and certainty, and reduce transactions costs.
142
  Achieving 
balance between the parties will not be easy,
143
 but such difficulties must be overcome due to the 
‘important policy consequences and practical implications in law’ for the relationship between 
goods and IP.
144
   
Conceptual issues 
The sui generis conceptual nature of IPRs makes it difficult, if not impossible, to overlay the 
current English framework on security interests.  A common suggestion to deal with this is to 
focus on the commercial nature of IPR financing, and let the parties avoid conceptual problems 
                                                 
140
 http://securedtransactionslawreformproject.org/. See also the Case for Reform, available at 
http://securedtransactionslawreformproject.org/the-case-for-reform/. 
141
 The revision process of Article 9 in the US involved engagement with representatives from the IP industry 
(broadly construed): SO Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’ (1999) 74 
Chicago-Kent L Rev 1077 at 1078.   
142
 These are the goals of the US Article 9 systems: see eg Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under 
Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1077; the UNCITRAL system: see UNCITRAL, Supplement, above n 120 
at [1]; and also the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project, above n 140. 
143
 cf Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1078: this task 
‘generated more controversy than most provisions of Revised Article 9.’ 
144
 RT Nimmer ‘Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Property Asset Financing’ (2001) 53 Maine L Rev 287 at 294. 
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by merely licensing the IPR.
145
  However, this founders in light of the commercial reality of 
complex chains of transactions, resulting from multiple sources of goods and IPRs,
146
 and 
multiple sources of financing (including of course secured financing).  One major problem 
concerns the use of assignment and licensing as a means of disposition of use-rights over IPRs 
down a chain of transactions.
147
  Conceptualising the grant of a non-exclusive license of software 
(for example) as giving rise to a security interest is difficult, because ‘the licensor … incurs no, 
or a nominal, marginal cost in entering into a new, additional non-exclusive license.’148  If this is 
so, then an arguably unnecessary distinction could arise between exclusive and non-exclusive 
licenses.  This gives rise to absurdity, in light of the hyper-mobile nature of digital information, 
as the only thing differentiating the different types of license is the claim to exclusivity imposed 
by the licensor. 
Another possible solution may be broader utilisation of special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
149
  
This approach may be more complex and costly at the outset, but it provides flexibility and 
partially resolves certain conceptual problems concerning ordinary mortgages and charges over 
                                                 
145
 See above n 85. 
146
 Especially as 3D printing may have a substantial impact on the nature of supply chains: B Depoorter ‘Intellectual 
Property Infringements & 3D Printing: Decentralized Piracy’ (2014) 65 Hastings LJ 1483 at 1484-1485. 
147
 This is also a problem for the UNCITRAL approach.  The Supplement points out that should a State adopt the 
functional approach to security, it would need to ‘coordinate’ its law relating to security over IPRs if that area of law 
rested on a non-functional expression of security interests: UNCITRAL, Supplement, n 120 above at [5].  So any 
right over an IPR which secures an obligation to pay the acquisition price of an IPR is a security interest (this is the 
functional approach), but, importantly, this functionalism extends to a license to use an IPR: ibid [9].  In terms of 
coverage, the Supplement takes another broad approach (at [14]): ‘The owner, licensor or licensee may encumber all 
or part of its rights, if they are transferable under law relating to intellectual property.’  However, it is not the case 
that all licence agreements create a security interest (see [23]); instead the particular nature of the agreement, and, 
more fundamentally, the state IP law, will determine whether what occurs between the parties actually creates a 
security interest.  For an example of the impact of the specific agreement: Northrop Grumman Mission Systems 
Europe Ltd v BAE Systems (Al Diriyah C41) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 844. 
148
 Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1083 fn 21. 
149
 See eg Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 95-96.  Similarly, cf M Risch ‘The 
Securitization of Patents’ (2013) 63 Duke LJ 89 (patent portfolios should be treated like securities, and tradable as 
such); D Solomon and M Button ‘Intellectual Property Securitization’ (2014) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462216.  For an outline of SPVs, see eg A Hudson The Law of Finance (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2013) ch 44. 
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IPRs,
150
 and may allow for effective reversion of IPRs following repayment of the asset-backed 
securities.
151
  Nevertheless, SPVs may mask the ownership of IPRs, as an SPV may (indeed most 
probably will) contain a large variety of IPRs: it becomes difficult to determine specifics of 
individual IPRs.  A further difficulty with SPVs is that they may be used as a means to avoid 
registration.
152
  It is also arguable that securitization may only be viable for those IPRs holders 
with established reputations for income generation.
153
  Furthermore, there is only a partial 
resolution of conceptual difficulties, in the sense that the underlying conceptual problems remain 
and are only side-stepped by utilization of the SPV approach.
154
  As such, SPVs cannot be 
considered a panacea, even if this area is not a zero-sum game between securitization and 
security interests. 
Another alternative may be to simply legislate for a new conceptual structure.  This 
happened with trade marks, and the conceptual difficulties with patents appear to be caused by 
statutory provisions in the first place.  However, the considerable array of IPRs would necessitate 
a Herculean legislative effort which may not be efficient.  As noted though, there is considerable 
interconnection between the conceptual problems and problems concerning registration.  The 
answer may therefore lie in a radical solution – a single unitary functional security interest 
available for both tangible assets and IPRs.  Whilst a unitary security interest in English law 
                                                 
150
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 95-96.   
151
 Solomon and Button ‘Intellectual Property Securitization’, above n 150 at 44. 
152
 Another potential problem, presented as a benefit by Solomon and Button ‘Intellectual Property Securitization’, 
above n 150 at 44 is the off-balance-sheet nature of securitization.  Solomon and Button do note (at 48-64) the 
potential problems of securitization, especially in light of the collapse of Enron and the 2008 global credit crisis. 
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 Solomon and Button ‘Intellectual Property Securitization’, above n 150 at 28 (referring to securitization of 
copyright in the entertainment industry).  See further eg JB Sylva ‘Bowie Bonds Sold for Far More Than a Song: 
The Securitization of Intellectual Property As a Super-Charged Vehicle for High Technology Financing’ (1999) 15 
Santa Clara Comp & High Tech LJ 195. 
154
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 96 admits as much. 
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would be itself a substantial and novel step,
155
 any reform without this step would not resolve the 
practical difficulties of distinct, rivalrous registration regimes (which are not designed to perform 
the function of a security regime).  The truly radical step though is the dissolution of the 
distinction between tangible assets and IPRs.  Whilst radical, this step would provide a 
‘conceptual neatness’ as well as reducing transaction costs.156  It would also reduce or even 
eliminate the tensions arising from placing too much weight on licences and other personal 
agreements, as mechanisms for resolving what are proprietary issues (as between debtor and 
creditor, and between both debtor and creditor and third parties).  Furthermore, in light of the 
identified potential growth of integrated goods, treating as the same (for security purposes at the 
very least) tangible assets and IPRs would allow for an easy route into the world of secured 
financing for creators and users of integrated goods.  But since it is clear that English law already 
operates under a system whereby security interests do not distinguish, formally at least, between 
different types of asset,
157
 what this radical proposal reduces down to is an alternative 
registration regime. 
Registration 
A unified registry of security interests over goods and IPRs is both valuable and possible.  The 
Secretary of State already has the power to make provision for information sharing between the 
general register of charges and any special register.
158
  However, this opportunity was not taken 
                                                 
155
 cf L Gullifer ‘Quasi-security Interests: Functionalism and the Incidents of Security’ in I Davies (ed) Issues in 
International Commercial Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) ch 1 for an overview of the various sides of the debate. 
156
 ibid at 28-29.  Gullifer was not referring to security over IPRs, but it is suggested the point remains valid. 
157
 See above n 8. 
158
 Companies Act 2006, s 893. 
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up when the reforms of April 2013 were implemented.
159
  Even if it were so taken, mere 
information sharing would not resolve the conceptual difficulties within the current system, nor 
would it resolve the problems inherent in the current registration requirements.   
A preferable solution would a single unified register.  As Tosato correctly notes, there are no 
overwhelming ontological reasons against the use of a single register.
160
  One possible problem 
concerns the prohibition against formality requirements for copyright under the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1971, Article 5(2).
161
  It is unclear 
as to whether Article 5(2) extends as far as formalities governing the operation of a secured 
transactions system,
162
 and academic analyses appear to have overlooked this issue.
163
  
Nevertheless, the Article 5(2) prohibition is not absolute.  First, it only applies to international 
works; domestic works may face domestic formalities.
164
  Second, it does not extend to all 
                                                 
159
 The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/600, Sched 2 para 3(2) updated the 
Companies Act 2006, s 893 to take into account the changes wrought by the Regulations.  However these 
Regulations were not concerned with the registration: see Beale, Bridge, Gullifer and Lomnicka The Law of Security 
and Title-Based Financing, above n 9 at paras 9.21 fn 54; 10.02; 10.69 (noting that the intention to do so in the 
future remains).  The key test will be satisfying the Secretary of State ‘that appropriate information-sharing 
arrangements have been made’: Department of Business, Innovation & Skills ‘Government Response: Consultation 
on Registration of Charges Created by Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships’ (December 2010) at 
http://tinyurl.com/qye687e at para 26.  This however may be ‘is unlikely to find favour with the bureaucracy’: 
Burrell and Handler ‘The PPSA and Registered Trade Marks’, above n 75 at 602. 
160
 Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 101-102. 
161
 See eg Tosato ‘Security interests over intellectual property’, above n 6 at 102. 
162
 S von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at para 5.56.  Von Lewinski also 
suggests (at para 5.57) that ‘[r]egistration requirements regarding assignment and licences may raise doubts under 
certain circumstances’, but without relevant supporting authority (what is cited concerns the creation of rights rather 
than security interests per se).  See also S Ricketson and J Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2006) at para 6.103: ‘formality’ under Article 
5(2) merely concerns the bringing of a right into existence.  
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 There is no substantive discussion of this issue in Ricketson and Ginsburg International Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights, above n 162, or von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy, above n 162.  Cf P 
Goldstein and PB Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed, 2012) 
at 273: a priority dispute between transferees of the same copyright interest ‘will inevitably be resolved on a 
country-by-country basis.  From a transactional perspective, the problem with priorities arises not so much from the 
variety in national approaches as it does from the general absence of systematic methods for recording transfers and 
establishing priorities between competing claimants to the same interest.’   
164
 See eg von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy, above n 162 at para 5.55; Goldstein and 
Hugenholtz International Copyright, above n 163 at 224. 
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cognate formalities, such as those requiring transfers of rights to be evidenced in writing.
165
  The 
key is recognizing that ‘the Berne Convention does not declare that member states may not 
institute a system of formalities; it prohibits making enjoyment and exercise of copyright in non-
domestic works subject to them.’166  The acceptability of requiring compliance with formalities 
in order to gain more than a minimal level of protection, such as obtaining evidential benefits in 
litigation from registration,
167
 and the compatibility of ‘national laws that encourage voluntary 
provision of information that facilitates lawful use and licensing of works’,168 suggests that a 
unitary security interests register covering inter alia copyright would not infringe Article 5(2).
169
 
Moreover, there are also positive justifications for a unitary registry.  Arguably a single 
register of security interests over IPRs would be beneficial in itself,
170
 and as already noted, the 
conceptual difficulties with the current regime would be substantially reduced.  A more 
compelling, practical justification is also perhaps the simplest: there would be a reduction in 
search costs (and corresponding reductions in insurance costs against the failure of searches) for 
those wishing to identify the existence of security interests over IPRs in a world of integrated 
goods.
171
  A more radical approach may to simply consider, as Mooney suggests, a global 
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 Ricketson and Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, above n 162 at para 6.105, and n 322 
citing F Schönherr ‘On the Interpretation of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention: Taking as an Example the Greek 
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 ibid. 
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 ibid. 
169
 cf Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software Financing’, above n 46 at 150 fn 56: as the US adheres to the Berne 
Convention, ‘registration [of copyright] has become little more than an archaic formality, providing no important 
substantive benefits to the copyright holder (aside from the ability to grant a security interest under the Copyright 
Act).’ 
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 Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 324; Murphy and Ward ‘Proposal for a Centralized and 
Integrated Registry’, above n 43 at 298. 
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 Of course, a suitable register would have to operate with minimal delays.  Cf Lipton ‘Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property’, above n 11 at 290  fn 43: it can take anywhere between four and nine months to register a 
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security interests regime for all types of assets, along the same lines as the Cape Town 
Convention covering mobile equipment; this is radical only in the sense of jurisdictional reach 
rather than conceptual coverage.
172
   
  It is acknowledged that what is being recommended is merely a very broad suggestion for a 
unified register.  Whatever happens (whether a single register for goods and IPRs, or an 
integration of distinct registers), it is essential to take particular care with the form and operation 
of such a register.
173
  However, rather than attempting to construct a full-scale proposed single 
register (which would probably double the length of this article), two specific aspects which 
would need to be covered in any reformed system will instead be analysed: the role of purchase 
money security interests (PMSIs), and the protection available for third parties.  These issues 
give rise to issues peculiar to integrated goods.  For PMSIs the question arises as to what exactly 
is being purchased: the tangible or intangible or both?  Does a PMSI generate “super-priority”?  
If a PMSI could exist over software acquired to enhance integrated goods, what does that really 
mean in an era of upgrading?  The protection for third parties is an even more pressing issue.  
Purchasing integrated goods does not necessarily pass control (let alone ownership) of the 
software that makes the integrated goods work, nor would it necessarily alter security interests 
over the IPRs over other aspects which make the goods integrated (which of course go beyond 
                                                                                                                                                             
security interest in the US copyright register; Davies ‘Technology-based small firms’, above n 4 at 324: in the 
English system a delay of up to three months is possible, requiring financiers to ‘take a leap of faith’ 
172
 CW Mooney ‘The Cape Town Convention’s Improbable-but-Possible Progeny Part One: An International 
Secured Transactions Registry of General Application’ (2014) 55 Va J Int L 1.  Mooney’s suggestion is laudable, 
although he is, unfortunately, willing (at 12) to allow for discrete treatment for IPRs. 
173
 cf Murphy and Ward ‘Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry’, above n 43 at 359-362 (outlining three 
models of an IP register for security interests).  It would also be important to integrate such a registry with registers 
on orphan works, in light of the transience of digital information.  See eg M Favale, F Homberg, M Kretschmer, D 
Mendis and D Secchi, Copyright, and the Regulation of Orphan Works: A comparative review of seven jurisdictions 
and a rights clearance simulation (2013) at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-orphan-201307.pdf; The Copyright 
and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works) Regulations, SI 2014/2861; The Copyright 
and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations, SI 2014/2863.  For arguments against 
registers of IPRs, see eg A Bell and G Parchomovsky ‘Of Property and Information’ (2015) 116 Colum L Rev 237.  
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software and copyright).  Looking at the impact of and effect on third parties evidences the flaws 
of multiple registration regimes often not designed for integrated goods in the digital era.    
Purchase money security interests and IPRs 
Retention of title clauses, which arguably mitigate the need for a specific PMSI rule in English 
law, generally do not occur with IP transactions.
174
  If English law is to be reformed, then there 
needs to be a coherent PMSI rule for IPRs.  The US Article 9 regime can provide a useful basis 
for reform,
175
 but as will become clear the UNCITRAL approach is potentially more appropriate 
for integrated goods.   
Under the US system PMSIs have priority over prior perfected security interests, regardless 
of any after-acquired property clauses.  This is justified as PMSIs involve creditors giving new 
value enabling debtors to obtain a new asset.
176
  Contrary to the perfection-by-filing approach of 
Article 9,
177
 PMSIs are generally perfectible by possession, but the intangible nature of IPRs 
renders this approach moot,
178
 and thus PMSIs in IPRs can only be perfected by notice-filing.
179
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 R Boadle ‘A purchase money security interest in UK law?’[2014] LMCLQ 76, 89. 
175
 See generally K Meyer ‘A Primer on Purchase Money Security Interests under Revised Article 9’ (2001) 50 Kan 
L Rev 143; T Jackson and A Kronman ‘Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors’ (1979) 88 Yale LJ 1143.  
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Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform’ (1990-91) 79 Ky LJ 61 
at 111. 
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filing are at UCC §9-401–§9-403. 
178
 Weinberg and Woodward ‘Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactions’, above n 176 at 112.  This may 
have been the result of the drafters of Article 9 thinking that PMSIs in general intangibles would be unlikely: see 
Weinberg and Woodward, at 110 fn 207 (citing Gilmore Security Interests in Personal Property vol 2, above n 137 
at §29.5; G Gilmore ‘The Purchase Money Priority’ (1962-63) 76 Harv L Rev 1333, 1372).  UCC §9-102(a)(42) 
defines a general intangible as ‘any personal property, including things in action … and software.’  Official 
Comment 5(d) expands on this: ‘“General intangible” is the residual category of personal property, including things 
in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral.  Examples are various categories of intellectual 
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However, revised Article 9 potentially limits the availability of PMSIs for IPRs.  Article 9 
previously defined a PMSI as a security interest ‘to the extent that it is: … (b) taken by a person 
who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire 
rights in or use of the collateral if such value is in fact so used.’180  However, revised Article 9 
defines purchase money collateral as ‘goods or software that secures a purchase money 
obligation incurred with respect to that collateral’.181  This obviously excludes IPRs that cannot 
come within the definition of ‘software’,182 which is a considerable problem.183  Furthermore, 
UCC §9-103(c) states that a security interest over software can be a PMSI, but ‘[t]he software 
must be acquired by the debtor in a transaction integrated with the transaction in which the 
debtor acquired the goods, and the debtor must acquire the software for the principle purpose of 
using the software in the goods.’184  This distinction appears to be based on a policy decision, 
resting on the grounds that parties can negotiate between themselves,
185
 and that the 
‘marketplace’ had not indicated a need for PMSIs outside of goods.186  The effect is that an IPR 
holder, by means of licensing agreements, can prohibit licensees transferring interests in the IP 
product to a lender.
187
 
                                                                                                                                                             
property … As used in the definition of “general intangible,” “things in action” includes rights that arise under a 
license of intellectual property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for 
infringement. … “software” is a “general intangible” for purposes of this Article.’  It therefore appears that IPRs can 
be subject to an Article 9 security interest, though cf text following n 180. 
179
 For competing judicial approaches to the role of filing PMSIs over IPRs, see In re Avalon Software, Inc 209 BR 
517 (Bankr D Ariz 1997) and In re World Auxiliary Power Co, n 138 above. 
180
 UCC §9-107 (old). 
181
 UCC §9-103(a)(1). 
182
 UCC §9-102(a)(76): ‘“Software” means a computer program and any supporting information provided in 
connection with a transaction relating to the program.  The term does not include a computer program that is 
included in the definition of goods.’ 
183
 See eg L Brennan ‘Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts’ 
(2001) 23 Hastings Communication and Ent LJ 313 at 436-440. 
184
 UCC §9-103, Official Comment 5. 
185
 Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1103. 
186
 ibid at 1104. 
187
 Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software Financing’, above n 46 at 175-176.   
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What this really shows though is not that PMSIs cannot apply to IPRs; rather it shows that 
difficulties with PMSIs and IPRs are merely a function of the wider security interests regime.  If 
there is a coherent system of registration (which would be most effectively achieved through a 
unified register covering goods and IPRs), then determining the priority of PMSIs over IPRs, 
based on the records, will not be challenging.  The only substantive difficulty is whether to take a 
broad approach to PMSIs, which does not exclude certain types of IPRs (as seems to be the case 
with security interests in general under Article 9).
188
  It is at this point that the UNCITRAL 
Supplement can be usefully considered. 
Generally speaking, the Supplement allows acquisition security interests, ie PMSIs, over 
IPRs, but direct transposition of the provisions in the Guide on acquisition financing may not 
always be viable.
189
  Some legal systems may provide for an acquisition security interest in IPRs, 
specifically, copyright over software, where the software was embedded in goods which 
themselves were subject to an acquisition security interest.
190
  Other legal systems, specifically 
civilian systems, may provide for an acquisition security interest over IPRs in the form of a 
retention of title clause or hypothec.  Yet others would provide for an acquisition security interest 
in the form of a fixed charge, floating charge, or mortgage.
191
  In order to develop a system 
                                                 
188
 There may be potential difficulties with regard to proceeds, for which see eg Weinberg and Woodward ‘Easing 
Transfer and Security Interest Transactions’, above n 176 at 114-115; Lipson ‘Remote Control’, above n 128 at 
1374: ‘The mobility of [digital information] … expands the reach of proceeds beyond anything contemplated to 
date.’  In re S & J Holdings Corp 39 UCC Rep Serve 668 at 669 (Bankr SD Fla 1984) decided that royalties from 
the use of collateral (video games machines) were deemed not to be proceeds (to which the secured party could 
follow) as they were the result of use (and not sale) of the collateral (following the logic of In Re A E I Corp 11 
Bankr 97 at 102 (Bankr ED Pa 1981) (security interest in machinery and proceeds did not extent to rental payments 
from lease of the machinery)).  In In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc, above n 137, a patent was held 
not to be proceeds of a patent application.  Recent developments such as the revision of Article 9 (discussed in 
Lipson ‘Remote Control’, above n 128 at 1372-1378) raise further questions about the relationship between IPRs 
and proceeds.  See further eg Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1. 
189
  UNCITRAL Supplement, above n 120 at [255]-[256]. 
190
 This would appear to be the US Article 9 system. 
191
 This would appear to be the English system.  
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whereby acquisition security over IPRs would be acceptable, a number of issues would need to 
be clarified, essentially by legislative fiat.
192
   
The obvious clarifications would be explicit legislative acceptance of PMSIs over IPRs, 
alongside any special rules negating possessory aspects otherwise relevant to PMSIs.  Two other 
positions on acquisition security over IPRs were reached.  First, ‘States could adopt either a 
unitary or a non-unitary approach to acquisition financing’.193  This replicates the approach in the 
Legislative Guide, whereby acquisition finance may operate either under the non-unitary method 
(ie the specific types of security interests, such as a pledge or a mortgage, are retained) or the 
unitary method (whereby the name of the security interest has no impact).
194
  Obviously a non-
unitary approach would do nothing to resolve the identified problems with English law.
195
  The 
second position is the need to ‘develop appropriate distinctions between the acquisition financing 
of the intellectual property right itself and the acquisition financing of a licence or sub-licence of 
that intellectual property right.’196  Here, the Supplement suggests that priority disputes over 
royalties, in particular the risk faced by licensors that the secured creditor of a licensee will take 
priority, are best left to be resolved by means of contractual agreement in order to maintain 
parity of treatment of tangible and intangible assets.
197
  This is not ideal, as difficulties may arise 
in this process qua the licensors and licensees, but these difficulties are outweighed by the 
benefits that this system offers for third party purchasers of integrated goods, which are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
192
 UNCITRAL Supplement, above n 120 at [257]. 
193
 ibid. 
194
 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, above n 119 at [111].  See Recommendations 176-186 for the unitary approach, 
and Recommendations 187-202 for the non-unitary approach. 
195
 cf UNCITRAL Supplement, above n 120 at [280] recognising that problems may arise if states adopt one 
approach for tangible assets and the other approach for IPRs. 
196
 ibid at [257]. 
197
 ibid at [272]. 
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Further issues that were considered were ‘third-party effectiveness and priority of an 
acquisition security right in  intellectual property; (b) the priority of a security right registered in 
an intellectual property registry; and (c) the priority of a security right in proceeds of 
encumbered intellectual property.’198  The manner in which these issues are explored reinforces 
the approach taken by UNCITRAL, whereby IP is treated as distinct and not necessarily subject 
to full integration with goods.
199
  Nevertheless, this is not overly problematic, due to the 
Supplement’s explicit recognition that the primary purpose for which the IPR is held should 
guide analysis.  Thus transactions of IPRs by those who hold them for disposition will be 
considered transactions in the ordinary course of business.
200
  With this background policy 
acquisition security interests over IPRs would take priority over prior (all-asset) security interests 
provided that the acquisition interest was registered within a short time period (for cases where 
the IPR was acquired not for use, but for disposition, the grantee of the acquisition security 
interest would also have to notify the holders of prior security interests);
201
 this being a direct 
transposition of the approach taken with tangible assets.  However, the priority rules of any 
specific IP security interests regime would take precedence: the validity, effect and priority of an 
acquisition security interest would depend on whether the specialised regime allows for such 
interests.
202
  If there is no such divergence between IP and other security regimes, then 
UNCITRAL provides Recommendation 247:
203
 
 
                                                 
198
 Ibid at [258]. 
199
 ibid at [261]: ‘In adapting the law recommended in the Guide to intellectual property rights, the expression “sale, 
lease or license” should also be adapted to fit an intellectual property context in a manner that would be consistent 
with law relating to intellectual property.’ 
200
 ibid at [262]. 
201
 ibid at [263].  This extent of this time period would be defined by the relevant implementing state. 
202
 ibid at [264] – [268]. 
203
 ibid at 124 (would be Recommendation 186bis in the Guide). 
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The law should provide that the provisions on an acquisition security right in a tangible asset 
also apply to an acquisition security right in intellectual property or a licence of intellectual 
property.  For the purpose of applying these provisions:   
(a) Intellectual property or a licence of intellectual property:    
(i) Held by the grantor for sale or licence in the ordinary course of the 
grantor’s business is treated as inventory; and  
(ii) Used or intended to be used by the grantor for personal, family or 
household purposes is treated as consumer goods; and   
(b) Any reference to:  
(i) Possession of the encumbered asset by the secured creditor does not 
apply;  
(ii) The time of possession of the encumbered asset by the grantor refers to 
the time the grantor acquires the encumbered intellectual property or 
licence of intellectual property; and  
(iii) The time of the delivery of the encumbered asset to the grantor refers 
to the time the grantor acquires the encumbered intellectual property or 
licence of intellectual property. 
 
The importance of this recommendation in terms of being able to deal with the problems of 
integrated goods cannot be understated.  The key is in the deeming of IP and licences of IP as 
being the same as inventory (or consumer goods).  This would entail protection for those who 
acquire integrated goods in the ordinary course of business against claims made by secured 
creditors of IPRs holders, just as there is protection for those who take in the ordinary course of 
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business as against secured creditors of tangible goods per se. This approach can effectively 
account for the interconnection between IP and tangible things, enabling the development of a 
more coherent legal regime for financing integrated goods in a digital world.   
Third party purchasers  
If goods are purchased, unauthorised use of a third party IPR covering those goods will breach 
section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
204
  Such use may lead to an injunction preventing the 
sale of the goods, and possibly a Norwich Pharmacal order requiring the seller to disclose its 
suppliers.
205
  This may be problematic for defendants involved in close-knit supply chain 
relationships,
206
 or where there are unresolved disputes over the validity of IPRs, and there may 
be cost implications in bringing such actions where there are multiple users of the IPRs.
207
  
Fundamentally, there will be complications if there are multiple different IPRs covering various 
different aspects of the production of the goods, or where there is complex and substantial 
integration of goods and IPRs.
208
  Arguably, the law should be clarified in order to protect the 
final purchaser against two possibilities: first, as against the financier who attempts to follow 
their security interest over an IPR through to the purchased integrated goods; second, as against 
an IPR holder who wishes to prevent the final purchaser from dealing with the integrated goods.  
The second possibility has been discussed elsewhere,
209
 and need not be discussed here.  As to 
                                                 
204
 See generally Thomas ‘Goods with embedded software’, above n 24. 
205
 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133. 
206
 Wilko Retail Ltd v Buyology Ltd [2014] EWHC 2221 (IPEC) at [27]-[29] (trade mark infringment).  See also Jade 
Engineering (Coventry) Ltd v Antiference Window Systems Ltd [1996] FSR 461 (ChD) (design rights infringement). 
207
 Wobben Properties GmbH v Siemens plc [2014] EWHC 3173 (Pat).  See also Smith Kline and French 
Laboratories Ltd v Global Pharmaceutics Ltd [1986] RPC 394 (CA). 
208
 cf Lipson ‘Remote Control’, above n 128 at 1360: ‘The relationship between intellectual property protection and 
negotiability is not well understood.’ 
209
 Thomas ‘Goods with embedded software’, above n 24 at 176-177 (if goods have embedded software then IPR 
holders should be prohibited from following though to final innocent purchasers, and will be limited to a remedy as 
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the first possibility, it is suggested that the secured party should be prevented from following the 
IPRs, if the IPRs are attached to goods, where the goods have been acquired by a good faith 
purchaser for value and without notice.  Their remedy should come solely from the party as 
against whom the secured party made the risk assessment vis-à-vis the secured loan: this will be 
a vendor rather than the final purchaser.  To a degree this process already exists for copyright:  
 
A licence granted by a copyright owner is binding on every successor in title to his interest 
in the copyright, except a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and without 
notice (actual or constructive) of the licence or a person deriving title from such a purchaser; 
and references in this Part to doing anything with, or without, the licence of the copyright 
owner shall be construed accordingly.
210
 
 
However, this provision could be construed narrowly.  The reference to constructive notice is 
problematic.  It may be difficult, in an age where IP infringement is part of the general public 
consciousness, to suggest that a consumer, let alone a commercial actor, could claim absence of 
constructive notice of a pre-existing licence.  There is also the long-standing commercial distrust 
of constructive notice,
211
 which raises doubts about the appropriateness of this method of 
                                                                                                                                                             
against the initial vendor which can be satisfied by damages); S Balganesh ‘Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers’ 
(2016) 104 Cal L Rev (forthcoming) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568029) (arguing in favour of a 
voidable title rule in US copyright law).  Cf MBM Loos and C Mak ‘Remedies for Buyers in Case of Contracts for 
the Supply of Digital Content’ (Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-71, 2012) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087626 (recommending greater clarity on the transfer of ownership rights over digital 
content).  See also MA Lemley ‘IP in a World Without Scarcity’ (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2413974, 
24 March 2014) at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2413974 (the reduced relevance of scarcity brought about by 
technological change may lead to reactions by IPR holders, such as attempts to control goods). 
210
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90(4).  See also s 91(3). 
211
 Kettlewell v Watson (1882) LR 21 ChD 685 at 704 (Fry J); Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539 (CA) at 
545 (Lindley LJ); Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Co Ltd [1971] 3 WLR 661 (CA) at 667 
(Lord Denning MR). 
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protecting certain rights.
212
  Another problem concerns the fact that this particular provision is 
subject to the practical possibility of exclusive licences.  If a copyright holder grants an exclusive 
licence, then the ‘licensee under an exclusive licence has the same rights against a successor in 
title who is bound by the licence as he has against the person granting the licence.’213  It is easy 
to see how this particular provision essentially renders the protection for good faith purchasers 
meaningless,
214
 especially when the difficulties of extending such “first sale” or “exhaustion” 
doctrines to digital IPRs are recognised.
215
  The limited capacity of purchasers to avoid either the 
private ordering restrictions of licences, or the public policy limitations of digital exhaustion, is 
further subjected to rather draconian risks of punitive destruction of infringing goods. 
Directive 2004/48/EC on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
216
 which sees the 
protection of IPRs as a ‘paramount status’,217 potentially covers financiers as well as IPR 
                                                 
212
 See also J de Lacy ‘Reflections on the Ambit and Reform of Part 12 of the Companies Act 1985 and the Doctrine 
of Constructive Notice’ in J de Lacy (ed) The Reform of United Kingdom Company Law (London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd, 2002) 333 at 369-380 (demonstrating the extremely weak grounds for a rule of constructive notice 
concerning registered charges). 
213
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 92(2). 
214
 Townend Using Intellectual Property as Security, above n 5 at 34. 
215
 See eg Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi, Inc 934 FSupp2d 640 (DC SD NY 2013).  Compare [2012] Case C-
128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp and [2015] Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters Int’l BV v Stichting 
Pictoright.  See further Thomas ‘Sale of Goods and Intellectual Property’, above n 24 at 27-30; Mulligan (above n 
58); Mann ‘Secured Credit and Software Financing’, above n 46 at 151-153.  The ineffectiveness of first sale or 
exhaustion doctrines is also demonstrated in the non-digital arena: see eg Bowman v Monsanto Co 569 US __; 133 
SCt 1761 (2013) (farmer cannot reproduce seeds covered by a patent).  See generally A Perzanowski and J Schultz 
‘Reconciling Personal & Intellectual Property’ (2015) 90 Notre Dame L Rev 1211; A Perzanowski and J Schultz 
‘Legislating Digital Exhaustion’ (2015) 28 Berkeley Tech LJ 1535; S Reis ‘Toward a “Digital Transfer Doctrine?” 
The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Age’ (2015) 109 Northwestern U L Rev 173; A Perzanowski and J Schultz 
‘Digital Exhaustion’ (2011) 58 UCLA L Rev 889.  Cf JF Duffy and R Hynes ‘Statutory Domain and the 
Commercial Law of Intellectual Property’ (2016) 102 Va L Rev 1, though Duffy and Hynes do not consider Capitol 
Records and its implications in this area. 
216
 Directive 2004/48/EC on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.  Implemented by virtue of The Intellectual 
Property (Enforcement) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/608.  Intellectual Property (Enforcement etc) Regulations 
2006/1028, Explanatory Note [1]: Directive 2004/48/EC was implemented in Scotland but not England and Wales 
as Norwich Pharmacal, above n 205, was deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of the Directive.  In [2105] 
Case C-580/13 Coty Germany GmbH v Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg it was held that national banking secrecy laws 
could not override the obligation in Directive 2004/48, such that banks cannot unconditionally refuse to give 
information concerning IPR infringements to IPR holders. 
217
 Directive 2004/48/EC, Preamble (3).  
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holders.
218
  Although apparently restricted to commercial dealers in infringing goods, this is not 
entirely certain,
219
 and enforcement ‘where appropriate’ may involve destruction of goods in 
which infringing IPRs are embedded,
220
 or the seizure of infringing goods for evidential reasons 
or to ‘prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce’.221  It may even be 
that goods (‘materials and implements’) used to create the infringing goods, even if not 
themselves infringing goods, can be destroyed or otherwise removed from commerce,
222
 subject 
to a proportionality test.
223
  This is an overly restrictive approach, which further entrenches the 
rights of IPRs holders and their financiers, at the expense of third parties who may not know and 
certainly will not be able to control the creation and operation of such interests.  It also attempts 
to maintain a division between tangible and intangible assets which is likely to become 
technologically and commercially unfeasible.  For certain integrated goods this could be 
devastating.  Consider the risks for 3D printers making trademarked objects using a program 
acquired through sub-optimal means.  If the program breaches copyright the loss then the printer 
is at risk.  If the breach concerned the trademark, then even if the program did not breach 
copyright the printer would still be at risk.  Furthermore, even if the IPRs are all valid, a secured 
financier may decide to exercise control over the IPRs in order to resolve an unrelated issue with 
the producers of the IPRs protected elements, which could then impact on the 3D printers. 
                                                 
218
 ibid Preamble (18): ‘… also persons who have a direct interest and legal standing in so far as permitted by and in 
accordance with the applicable law’; Article 4(1)(b): ‘all other persons authorised to use those rights, in particular 
licensees’, are able to seek application for preventative measures. 
219
 ibid Preamble (14): ‘The measures provided for … need to be applied only in respect of acts carried out on a 
commercial scale. … Acts carried out on a commercial scale are those carried out for direct or indirect economic or 
commercial advantage; this would normally exclude acts carried out by end-consumers acting in good faith.’  
(Emphasis added).  See also Preamble (24). 
220
 Directive 2004/48/EC, Preamble (24). 
221
 ibid Article 7(1) (evidence); Article 9(1)(b) (entry into commerce). 
222
 ibid Article 10(1). 
223
 ibid Article 10(3); Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch). 
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Instead, the approach taken by UNCITRAL is worth considering.  One of the key objectives 
of the Guide (and thus the Supplement) is ‘[t]o enable interested parties to determine the 
existence of security rights in intellectual property in a clear and predictable way’.224  However, 
this is only one of number of objectives, all of which bar this particular instance are focused on 
the relationship between grantor and grantee of a security interest.  Thus, whilst there is 
recognition of the relationship third parties (as ‘interested parties’) have to the security interest, 
there is seemingly no overriding policy basis for supporting third parties.  Indeed, what this 
objective reveals is that the third party should merely have an inchoate capability to determine 
the existence of a security interest.  There is nothing in the way of a policy or other normative 
basis running through the UNCITRAL scheme supporting the idea that a third party should be 
able to acquire or otherwise deal with goods and/or IPRs free of a pre-existing security interest.  
It may be countered that the whole UNCITRAL scheme rests on registration and thus swift and 
cheap access to accurate information about encumbrances.  Nevertheless, such an aim may be 
rendered less effective by the presence of multiple registration regimes for IPRs as distinct from 
a general security interest register.   
The Supplement sets out that a security interest in tangible goods would not extend (without 
agreement between the parties) to IPRs attached to those goods, and vice versa.
225
  This reduces 
the problems ordinarily arising from focusing on the grantor and grantee of a security interest at 
the expense of third parties.  However, this approach is contingent on parties further up a chain 
of transactions agreeing to limit their rights.
226
  Thus a more radical approach is necessary in 
                                                 
224
 UNCITRAL Supplement, above n 120 at [47]. 
225
 ibid at 52, Recommendation 243 (which would be Recommendation 28bis in the Guide). 
226
 This is not impossible: patent pledges may have this effect.  See eg CD Assay ‘Patents as Informational Tools’ in 
JL Contreras and M Jacobs (eds) Patent Pledges: Global Perspectives on Patent Law’s Private Ordering Frontier 
(New York, NY: Edward Elgar, 2016) (forthcoming) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607612. 
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order to provide purchasers of integrated goods with the capacity to acquire goods for use or 
resale without potential unknowable and uncontrollable encumbrances over the intangible 
aspects of such goods.  This suggestion requires consideration of Article 9-321 of the UCC, 
which was added during the 2001 revision of Article 9.  It states: 
 
(a) “licensee in ordinary course of business” means a person that becomes a licensee of a 
general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of 
another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the 
business of licensing general intangibles of that kind.  A person becomes a licensee in the 
ordinary course if the license to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in 
the kind of business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor's own usual or 
customary practices. 
 
(b) A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights under a nonexclusive license 
free of a security interest in the general intangible created by the licensor, even if the 
security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence. 
 
Official Comment 2 to this section states that these rules are analogous to UCC §9-320 (which 
provides a buyer in ordinary course exception for purchasers of goods covered by a security 
interest), and that the rule in UCC §9-321(b) ‘reflects the expectations of the parties and the 
marketplace: a licensee under a nonexclusive license takes subject to a security interest unless 
the secured party authorizes the license free of the security interest or other, controlling law such 
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as that of this section (protecting ordinary-course licensees) dictates a contrary result.’227  In 
general this appears to be a valuable protection for licensees, not least because ‘holders of “off-
the-shelf” nonexclusive licenses likely have reasonable expectations that (as long as they 
perform their obligations) they will continue to have the right to use the license even if their 
licensor loses its rights as a result of a foreclosure by the licensor’s secured party.’228  Of course, 
it is also important to note that the limitation to licensees naturally excludes those who acquire 
by sale.
229
  Additionally, it has been argued that the default position should be that purchasers in 
the ordinary course of business should be able to acquire not just the right to use IPRs when 
integrated with goods, but also the right to treat such IPRs as their own.
230
  It is suggested that 
the same logic should apply to licensees even if they take under an exclusive license, not least 
because it appears very easy to introduce what would otherwise be very narrow limitations in 
order to convert a non-exclusive license into an exclusive license.
231
  There are other problems 
with this limitation to non-exclusive licences.  For one it is not clear what is meant by a non-
exclusive licence.
232
  In addition, there are problems concerning the ‘created by his seller’ 
limitation in the definition of a licensee in ordinary course of business: this essentially means 
that if there is a chain of transactions, the final purchaser cannot trump a party higher in the chain 
as such an interest is not created by his immediate vendor (or licensor).
233
  This limitation is 
                                                 
227
 As for authorization under the UCC, see eg S Thomas ‘The Role of Authorization in Title Conflicts Involving 
Retention of Title Clauses: Some American Lessons’ (2014) 43 CWLR 29. 
228
 Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1097. 
229
 cf Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1 at 1123-24: ‘True, most transactions in information 
technology assets are currently structured as licenses, not sales.  But it is not clear that licensing will always be the 
only ordinary course disposition of a general intangible.’ 
230
 Thomas ‘Goods with embedded software’, above n 24. 
231
 Weise ‘The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9’, above n 141 at 1099-1100. 
232
 Lipson ‘Financing Information Technologies’, above n 1 at 1124 (arguing that a non-exclusive license may not 
be capable of being subject to a security interest). 
233
 ibid at 1126. 
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compounded by further restrictions on the licensor’s behaviour: he must be in the business of 
licensing IPRs of the kind at hand.
234
 
These limitations have their supporters.  For example, Duffy and Hynes suggest it creates an 
appropriate general-level delineation of commercial and IP law.
235
  More substantively, Weise 
argues that Article 9 favours the secured party in circumstances where the customer (licensee in 
ordinary course here) is not a direct customer of the debtor, ‘not because downstream customers 
are not worthy of protection but because … the burden on the secured party to attempt to control 
a downstream sublicensor outweighs the benefits to the downstream customer.’236  This is 
because the secured party is only really able to ‘monitor and influence by contract’ the behaviour 
of its borrower,
237
 and it ‘reflects a balancing of the interests, expectations, and burdens of the 
various participants.’238  This analysis deals with non-exclusive licenses, and for exclusive 
licenses negotiation between the parties will avoid potential problems.
239
  Yet this seems to be 
inherently contradicted by the operational logic of UCC §9-321: ‘a secured party financing a 
licensor would “lose” if the licensor entered into a nonexclusive license agreement with, say, a 
distributor, who would then “take free” of the secured party’s security interest in the licensed 
general intangible’,240 but ‘the distributor would have the right to use the license for so long as it 
complies with all the terms of the license, including paying all license fees to the secured 
party.’241  This second point surely applies in both cases of exclusive and non-exclusive licences, 
and if so it can be questioned as to what exactly it is that justifies a distinction being made that 
                                                 
234
 ibid.  See also Lipson ‘Remote Control’, above n 128 at 1378-1388. 
235
 Duffy and Hynes ‘Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property’, above n 215, especially 
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affects downstream users of IPRs purely on the basis of the exclusivity or otherwise of the 
license of the immediate disponee of the final disponor of the licensed IPR.   
Technological developments render Weise’s analysis profoundly troubling.  There are real 
practical problems facing IPRs holders in controlling the use and disposition of integrated goods 
downstream.  However, as the John Deree case indicates,
242
 downstream parties suffer 
corresponding problems of equal if not greater difficulty in effectively controlling or knowing of 
upstream IPRs.
243
  This reality also applies to those who have security over IPRs as much as 
IPRs holders themselves.
244
  Whilst Weise’s approach may be a ‘perfectly logical allocation of 
the risks and burdens’ in the context of Article 9,245 this can only be accepted in the context of an 
Article 9 regime (necessitating contextualisation within the broader matrix of state and federal 
law concerning security over IPRs) which itself demonstrates a considerable number of flaws, 
not least in the sense of being incapable of providing a coherent legal framework for integrated 
goods.  Arguably, there is no ‘effective accommodation between information property rights law 
and [the Article 9 system].’246  Whilst this critique is necessarily founded on the claim that a 
radical new approach to the integration of IP and tangible goods is necessary in order to deal 
with the potential problems of 21st century commerce, it surely cannot be a reasonable defence 
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to say, in essence, our 20th century regime is acceptable as a means of regulating transactions in 
21st century goods.
247
 
CONCLUSION 
The various problems with the current English system means ‘relying on intellectual property as 
security for loans can be more difficult, and more risky, for financiers than dealing with more 
“traditional” assets as security.’248  As such, different forms of financing may be preferred.249  
However, ‘[t]he effective creation of security interests in IP may … be of great importance to the 
survival of technology-based small firms with otherwise few tangible assets to offer as 
security.’250  Similarly, as the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, when ‘software 
companies don’t attract equity financing like tulips in seventeenth century Holland, these 
companies will have to borrow more capital.  After-acquired software is likely to serve as much 
of their collateral.’251 
Fundamentally, ‘[t]he law should not impair the ability of debtors to secure as much or as 
little of their debts with as much or as little of their existing and future property as they deem 
appropriate.’252  As such it could be argued that IP law should be made more flexible and 
responsive to party autonomy, thus allowing IPRs holders to negotiate varying levels of 
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protection.
253
  This would bring IP law closer in nature to security interests and sales law, and 
would allow for greater market-driven flexibility in negotiating and bargaining over security 
interests.  However, whilst this may benefit debtors and creditors, it arguably would add little if 
any additional protection to third parties ie purchasers.  A more appropriate approach would 
instead acknowledge the impact of the changes to the relevance of scarcity on IP law: IP law 
should not be abused to restrict the free flow of information.
254
  Davies suggests that the current 
problems can only be resolved through the ‘emergence of a completely new body of commercial 
finance law to support the development and exploitation of IP as economic assets.’255  This 
makes sense,
256
 especially when the lack of coordination between security interests, sales and IP 
is acknowledged.
257
  A new approach would also help avoid the problem that one’s preference 
for a particular system will depend on whether one is a commercial or IP lawyer.
258
   
This new commercial law would have to adapt to the ‘unusual dynamics of software as an 
asset’,259 particularly with the growth of integrated goods.  A security interests regime for IPRs 
that is designed for purpose (rather than the current English system) would be better for those 
who are developing intangible assets that are protected as IPRs, but a new commercial law 
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founded on the integration between goods and IPRs would be better still.  This new commercial 
law could be substantiated by taking what Lipson terms a ‘functional approach’.260  This takes a 
dual meaning: first, ‘courts should recognize that the functions of intellectual property law and 
commercial law are different’, and second, ‘information as collateral should be treated like 
functionally analogous categories of goods’.261  Thus whilst IP law concerns rights of ownership 
(title), secured transactions law is concerned with rights of priority,
262
 and the current 
disconnection between different systems makes it possible for certain parties to ‘exploit the 
unusual systemic asymmetries endemic to intellectual property financing.’263  Relying on the 
current doctrine arguably restricts the potential monetisation of IPRs, not least because of the 
way it necessitates differential treatment of inherently integrated aspects of a particular asset.  
Avoiding this requires focusing on the functional nature of the things subject to security 
interests: ‘information technologies … will not always function like intangibles have in the past.  
Instead, information technology assets will often function like tangible goods’.264  Conversely, 
tangible goods will begin to function like information technology assets.  The ‘most promising’ 
approach is to consider function and treat such assets as analogous to “normal” collateral.265  As 
has been shown, there are potential mechanisms to deal with this reality internal to both the 
Article 9 and UNCITRAL systems, and they should be drawn upon in any future reform of 
English law.   
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